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CHAPTER I
CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY
Bertrand Russell begins the chapter on Descartes
in his monumental work "A History of Western Philosophy"
with the following sentences:
Rene Descartes <1596 - 1650) is usually
considered the founder of modern philosophy,
and, I think, rightly. He is the first man of
high philosophic capacity whose outlook is
profoundly affected by the new physics and
astronomy. While it is true that he retains much
of scholasticism, he does not accept foundations
laid by predecessors, but endeavors to construct
a complete philosophic edifice de novo.
(Russell 1945, 557)
In this chapter we will try to give an overview of
the main results of the philosophical life work of
Descartes. These philosophical theses will form the frame
of the discussion of most of what is to come in later
chapters of this thesis. In our presentation we will give
priority to Descartes' exposition of his philosophical
system in "Meditations on First Philosophy" (1641), taking
into account the "Discourse on Method" and "The Principles
of Philosophy" where appropriate .
^
1
2In th© first of the six "Meditations on First
Philosophy in which the existence of God and the
distinction of the soul from th© body are demonstrated”
Descartes lists the things that he has com© to doubt. In
fact it has occurred to him that as a child he has
developed many prejudices about the world around him and
about himself which later turned out to be false, so that
he will now try to rid himself of all the beliefs that he
has had which might even be doubtful to the smallest
degree. The task of these meditations is to assume
everything to be false which is not absolutely indubitable
and to reconstruct all knowledge about the external world,
about his own mind and about God on the basis of the first
indubitable principles he can find. But what is
indubitable? Can we, for example, rely on our senses to
tell us the truth about the external world? Descartes
concludes that w© cannot:
All that up to the present time I have accepted
as most true and certain I have learned either
from the senses or through the senses; but it is
sometimes proved to mo that these senses are
deceptive, and it is wiser not to trust entirely
to any thing by which we have once been
deceived. (145)^
Furthermore, there are madmen in the world who
believe themselves to be kings and who purport to see
things that other people do not see. How can we know that
3we aren't like these poor people, e.g. that we aren't also
mistaken in our belief that what we believe ourselves to
se© really exists? And worse, even if we assume ourselves
to be mentally sound, nevertheless there are times,
©specially at night during our dreams, when it seems that
wo perceive things in the external world which aren't
really there and when we believe ourselves to be in rooms
we have never been in etc. How do we know at any time
t that we are awake rather than asleep?
Of course, we con tell that we are awake from the
fact that our hands move when we intend to move them and
likewise our head turns when we wont it to turn. But stop,
how do we know that we aren't mistaken in assuming that w©
have hands and heads? Maybe there exists a God who
constontly tries to misleod us into believing things about
the world which aren't really true .
^
We prefer to believe that there does not exist such a
vicious God. For us, God is a being with best intentions
who only wants our best.
But possibly God has not desired that I
should be thus deceived, for He is said to be
supremely good. If» however, it is contrary to
His goodness to have mad© me such that I
constantly deceive myself, it would also appear
to be contrary to His goodness to permit me to
be sometimes deceived, and nevertheless I cannot
doubt that He does permit this. (147)
4Thus, if we want to follow the method for rightly
conducting our reason and for seeking truth then we cannot
assume that God will not deceive us unless this follows
from indubitable premisses. Until then the following
holds
:
I shall then suppose, not that God who is
supremely good and the fountain of truth, but
some evil genius not less powerful than
deceitful, has employed his whole energies in
deceiving me; I shall consider that the heavens,
the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all
other external things are nought but the
illusions and dreams of which this genius has
availed himself in order to lay traps for my
credulity: I shall consider myself as having no
hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any
senses ... ( 148)
It seems then that if we follow the method of the
Cartesian doubt, then we "feel constrained to confess that
there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be
true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt" (148).
Meditation I therefore leaves us with a state of affairs
in which nothing is certain about our knowledge. But
Descartes does not give up. He is decided to take the
challenge of seeking something which is absolutely certain
so that he can base other knowledge on this certitude or
if he cannot find such a thing to conclude that there is
at least one certainty! namely that nothing is certain.
Even that result would refute the sceptics who were
5claiming that nothing is certain, since we would at least
have found one certain proposition.
We still hope to find something which is
indubitable. What might it be however? Not God, for he
might be an object of my dreams. Not senses, bodies etc.,
since I had persuaded myself that I might be deceived by
something or somebody to take their existence for granted
although they do not really exist. Stop! I just thought
that I persuaded myself of something:
of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded
myself of something (or merely because I thought
of something) . But there is some deceiver or
other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever
employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then
without doubt I exist also if he deceives me,
and let him deceive me as much as he will, he
can never cause me to be nothing so long as I
think that I am something. So that after having
reflected well and carefully examined all
things, we must come to the definite conclusion
that this proposition: I am, I exist, is
necessarily true each time that I pronounce it,
or that I mentally conceive it. (150)
This argument is commonly referred to as the "cogito**
.
We thus have found the base of our reconstruction of
knowledge, we have found at least one indubitably true
proposition. On this basis we can build up the body of our
knowledge through orderly philosophizing.
Let us therefore take the next step, from
6Descartes' point of view: I know now that I exist. But we
have not yet determined, what and who I am, I who
necessarily exist. To find out what I am, I have to
determine my essence, in other words: I have to find the
element or the property that I perceive if and only if I
perceive myself.
5
It cannot be my body, since I who exist because I think,
can conceive of myself as existing without a body. And it
can also not be the property of walking, for first of all
I do not have a body and second, even if I had one, then
the great deceiver might still give me the impression of
walking although I am lying in my bed deep asleep. Isn't
there anything that cannot be detached from me, no matter
what happens? Well, there is: my thoughts. Those cannot be
taken away from me. Even if I am deceived, still I am
thinking. Each time that I perceive myself I perceive
thinking and each time I perceive thinking, I perceive
myself.^
Therefore,
I do not now admit anything which is not
necessarily true: to speak accurately I am not
more than a thing which thinks, that is to say a
mind or a soul, or an understanding, or a
reason, which are terms whose significance was
formerly unknown to me. I am, however, a real
7thing and really exist; but what thing? I have
answered: a thing which thinks. (152)
Cartesian doubt has led us to establish the sentence "I
think, I am” as the firm foundation of our body of
knowledge. Further research makes clear that my essence is
and that I as a thinking being need neither a
body nor any other material thing for my existence.
P"urthermore
, since the essence of me, the thinking soul,
is thinking, I must always think, whether I am asleep or
not
.
I think, i.e. I doubt, understand, affirm, deny,
will, refuse, imagine and feel. How do I sense, perceive
things? This is a difficult question to answer. For, take
a piece of wax. It may smell of flowers, it has a certain
color, shape and size; it is hard and cold. So it seems to
have everything needed for me to know it distinctly. But
all of this ceases rapidly, if I put it close to fire.
Suddenly it loses its odor, color, its original shape.
Furthermore it becomes hot. I have to ask myself the
question: Does the same wax remain? I think so; but whidh
property of the wax is it that allows me to judge that
after this transformation I am still perceiving the same
wax as before? None of the sensible qualities I named so
far, for they are all subject to change. "We must then
grant that I could not even understand through the
dimagination what this piece of wax is, and that it is my
mind alone which perceives if (155). This is true in
general
;
There is certainly in me a certain passive
faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and
recognising the ideas of sensible things, but
this would be useless to me (and I could in no
way avail myself of it)
,
if there were not
either in me or in some other thing another
active faculty capable of forming and producing
these ideas. (191)
We can know things with our minds, our senses are not of
much use in this respect:
no ideas of things, in the shape in which we
envisage them by thought, are presented to us by
the senses. So much so that in our ideas there
is nothing which was not innate in the mind, or
faculty of thinking, except only these
circumstances which point to experience. .. They
transmitted something which gave the mind
occasion to form these ideas, by means of an
innate faculty, at this time rather than
another .
^
Descartes does not dispense with external
experience altogether, rather he postulates an interaction
between the sense perception of data from the external
world and an innate capacity of idea-formation. The mind
is a universal instrument of reason analyzing sensory
expsrisnces in a predetsrmined innate manner . Learning is
thus remembering of knowlege already in the mind, rather
9than the acquisition of new information through sensory
experience* very much in a Platonic manner;®
And not only do I know these things with
distinctness when I consider them in general,
but likewise (however little I apply my
attention to the matter)
, I discover an
infinitude of particulars respecting numbers,
figures, movements, and other such things, whose
truth is so manifest, and so well accords with
Jwy nature, that when I begin to discover them,
it seems to me that I learn nothing new, or
recollect what I formerly knew - that is to say,
that I for the first time perceive things which
were already present to my mind, although I had
not as yet applied my mind to them. (179)
Gardner also notes the similarity of Descartes' theory of
knowledge with Plato's:
If Descartes could have dispensed with external
experience altogether, he would have been
pleased to do so; again, like Plato, he
attributed human error and inconstancy to the
vagaries of experience, and our rationality,
understanding and genuine knowledge to the mind
reflecting upon its own ideas. (Gardner 1985,
52)
But our powers of reasoning are not infinite. In
fact, they are delimited by the structure of our mind and
our mind is finite. We are thus only capable of "limited
knowledge" (177) and we have to be grateful to our creator
that he gave us what we have:
10
For I have certainly no cause to complain thatGod has not given me an intelligence which is
more powerful, or a natural light which is
stronger than that which I have received from
Him, since it is proper to the finite
understanding not to comprehend a multitude of
things, and it is proper to a created
understanding to be finite... ( 177 )
However, these severe constraints on our faculty
of knowledge still leave a vast terrain of knowable
matter, which cannot be imitated by a finite machine. This
comes out in the discussion of the "language test" and
automata in the next chapter.
So far we have established that we as thinking
beings exist, that the essence of our soul is thinking in
the broad sense and that the class of thinking-faculties
which enable us to analyze sensory experience from the
external world as information is innate. Our intellect is
finite, although it is a universal instrument of reason
and allows flexible responses to external stimuli in
indefinitely many situations.
We do not yet know that there exist bodies. To
prove this we first have to prove the existence of God.
This is proven by assuring ourselves that we have a clear
and distinct idea of God in us.^
This very idea that I have of God shows him to be perfect
11
infinite and therefore incomprehensible for me with my
finite mind. What is the origin of this idea in me? It has
to be the effect of some cause. But
now it is manifest by the natural light that
there must at least be as much reality in the
efficient and total cause as in its effect. For,
pray, whence can the effect derive its reality,
if not from its cause? And in what way can this
cause communicate this reality to it, unless it
possessed it in itself? And from this it
follows, not only that something cannot proceed
from nothing, but likewise that what is more
perfect - that is to say, which has more reality
within itself - cannot proceed from the less
perfect. (162)
So, God has to exist, for otherwise the existence of this
idea of this perfect, infinite being in me, an imperfect
and finite being, would be inexplicable. And it follows
also that God cannot be a deceiver, since my idea of him
tells me that he is perfect; but being a deceiver would
certainly mean imperfection. It can thus be proven by my
light of nature that God is not a deceiver which in turn
will lead us to other insights:
But after I have recognised that there is a God
- because at the same time I have also
recognised that all things depend upon Him, and
that He is not a deceiver, and from that have
inferred that what I perceive clearly and
distinctly cannot fail to be true... (184)
Among the things that I have ideas about are objects which
12
have certain properties, modes. These are modes like
extension and color. These’ modes must have a bearer, since
modes cannot exist without a substance that they are
attached to. But this substance cannot be me as a thinking
substance, since extension and color are not modes of a
thinking substance. They therefore have to be attached to
material bodies and in fact I see clearly and distinctly
that these material objects exist outside of me. If this
were not true, then God would be deceiving me in making me
believe that there are material bodies outside me with
certain sensible properties. But God is no deceiver:
therefore material things outside of me have to exist.
This is established now.
One specific body that exists is more closely
related to my soul than others, for I have the ideas of
pain, thirst and hunger in my soul when this body is
ill-disposed, suffers thirst or hunger. Since I do not
have these ideas when other bodies are in these states, I
have the clear and distinct idea that my soul is united
with one and only one body. There are some important
differences between my body and my soul. Wy body, for
example, is divisible, it consists of arms and legs etc.
Even if an arm or some other extremity were taken away
from my body, this wouldn't affect my mind. But my mind is
indivisible; all the faculties of the mind are aspects of
13
t.he same capacxt,/ of thinking. If we hadn't been convinced
of the difference of body and soul anyway, this would have
been enough to mark a clear distinction between these two
substances. Body and mind have entirely different essences
and modes
.
With this first formulation of Cartesian dualism
we end our selective overview of Cartesian philosophy and
turn to a more substantial argument for the dualism of
mind and body in Descartes' work: chapter 2 will deal with
the "language test" as an argument that man has a
mind/soul whose performance cannot be explained in
mechanical terms.
footnotes to Chaeter 1
1. Consequently most of the quotations from the
oriqinal works of Descartes will be taken from the
Meditations, so that it will be understood that the
quotations are from this work, unless specifed
1 y • All our quotes are taken from the translation
in Haldane/Ross (1911).
2. We find a similar quotation in the Principles, Part I.
This same feeling seems to be expressed more than 300
years later by the biologist and Noble Prize winner George
Beadle when he writes about an experiment designed to
prove the correctness of the DNA-structure proposed by
Watson/Crick (1953):
The evidence is fairly convincing that these are
single chains of DNA. This experiment strongly
suggests that the Watson-Crick hypothesis of
DNA-replication is correct, but does not prove
it. A perverse nature might have devised another
way of giving the observed results. (Beadle
1963)
4. There exist different interpretations of the cogito in
the literature. Wilson (1978), for example defends the
"naive" interpretation of the cogito, which is attacked in
Hintikka (1967) where the "performatory interpretation of
the cogito" is proposed (on that cf. also Feldman (1973)).
Matthews (19 ) argues for a "methodological
interpretation". We will not defend one or the other of
these interpretations here, since our later discussion is
quite independent of this topic. An argument very much
like the cogito had been given before by St. Augustine.
5. For this method of determining the essence of some
object, cf. Malcolm (1965).
6. Descartes takes "thinking" in the broad sense: "A thing
which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing
which doubts, understands, (conceives), affirms, denies,
wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. * (153)
14
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7. Quoted in Gardner 1985, 52)
mirrors essentially the theory of knowledge deve-loped by Plato in the Meno-dialogue (81 c ff) and Phaidon(72e - 77b). Cf . the following passage from Weno:
Seeing then that the soul is immortal, and has
been born many times, and has beheld all things
in this world and the world beyond, there is
nothing it has not learnt; so it is not
that it can be reminded of virtue and
other things which it knew before. For since the
whole of nature is akin, and the soul has
i®®rned all things, there is nothing to prevent
someone, upon being reminded of one single thing
- which men call learning - from rediscovering
all the rest, if he is courageous and faints not
in the search. For learning and inquiry are then
wholly recollection. (Plato 1984, 163f)
In the Notes ®S®inst a certain BEggram it
seems at first sight as if Descartes is denying his claim
of innateness, for there he says that he never claimed
that the mind had innate ideas besides those which make up
its capacity of thinking. But one should bear in mind that
Descartes has a very broad concept of thinking; doubting,
understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing,
imagining and sensing are all acts of thinking. And some
of these innate ideas are of a special kind, they are
dispositions for the analysis of external data presented
to the mind, as comes out quite clearly from the following
passage from the Notes:
but when I observed the existence in me of
certain thoughts which proceeded, not from
extraneous objects nor from the determination of
my will, but solely from the faculty of thinking
which is within me, then, that I might
distinguish the ideas or notions (which are the
forms of these thoughts) from other thoughts
adventitious or factitious, I termed the former
'innate'. In the same sense we say that in some
families generosity is innate, in others certain
diseases like gout or gravel, not that on this
account the babies of these families suffer from
these diseases in their mother's womb, but
because they are born with a certain disposition
or propensity for contracting them. (442)
Here, he says that ideas and concepts are innate and that
16
they form the capacity of thinking. This same point is
made two pages later:
And surely it is manifest to every man that
sight, of itself and by its proper function,
presents nothing beyond pictures, and hearing
nothing beyond voices or sounds, so that all
these things that we think of, beyond these
voices or pictures, as being symbolised by them,
are presented to us by means of ideas which come
from no other source than our faculty of
thinking, and are accordingly together with that
faculty innate in us, that is, always existing
in us potentially; for existence in any faculty
is not actual but merely potential existence,
since the very word 'faculty' designates nothing
more or less than a potentiality. (444)
Descartes' conception of visual perception has been proved
correct to a very large extent during the last 25 years.
David Hubei and Torsten Wiesel received a Noble Prize in
1981 for their work on the neurological basis of visual
perception which showed that the brain is endowed with
neuronal circuits at birth which channel the input of the
senses already in predetermined forms, cf. Hubel/Wiesel
<1962, 1978). Cf. also the remark by the psychologist
Jacques Mehler who sums up a discussion of recent findings
in human biology and psychology; "One can no longer argue
that the human infant is a tabula rasa without innate
dispositions, curiosity and capabilities" (in
Piatelli-Palma- rini <1980, 349).
Moreover, these innate ideas for the analysis of external
experience are quite specific:
Hence it follows that the ideas of the movements
and figures are themselves innate in us. So much
the more must the ideas of pain, colour, sound
and the like be innate, that our mind may, on
occasion of certain corporeal movements,
envisage these ideas, for they have no likeness
to the poaterous than that all common notions
which are inherent in our mind should arise from
these movements, and should be incapable of
existing without them? I should like our
friend to instruct me as to what corporeal
movement it is which can form in our mind any
common notion, e.g. the notion that things
®Sy3i b9 the same thing are sgual to
one another', or any other he pleases; for all
17
these movements are particular, but notions are
universal having no affinity with movements and
no relation to them. (443)
On the other hand Descartes claims that “I persuaded
myself easily that I had no idea in my mind which had not
formerly come to me through the senses". (1S8>. This seems
to directly contradict all the other claims about innate
ideas in his writings. I do not see at this point how to
resolve the contradiction.
9. Not everybody seems to have (had) such an idea, however.
We will try to show some empathy and will just follow
Descartes^ meditation, as if our minds were connected to
his
.
CHAPTER II
DESCARTES ON BEASTS AND HUMAN BEINGS
2.1 The Text
In the Discourse, Descartes engages in a
^^®cussion about the difference between humans and
animals. His characterization of the faculties of animals
is as follows:
Here I specially stopped to show that if there
had been such machines, possessing the organs
and outward form of a monkey or some other
animal without reason, we should not have had
any means of ascertaining that they were not of
the same nature as those animals. On the other
hand, if there were machines which bore a
resemblance to our body and imitated our actions
as far as it was morally possible to do so, we
should always have two very certain tests by
which to recognise that, for all that, they were
not real men. The first is, that they could
never use speech or other signs as we do when
placing our thoughts on record for the benefit
of others. For we can easily understand a
machine's being constituted so that it can utter
words, and even emit some responses to action on
it of a corporeal kind, which brings about a
change in its organs; for instance, if it is
touched in a particular part it may ask what we
wish to say to it; if in another part it may
exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it
never happens that it arranges its speech in
various ways, in order to reply appropriately
to everything that may be said in its presence,
as even the lowest type of man can do. And the
18
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second difference is, that although machines can
certain things as well as or perhaps
better than any of us can do, they infallibly
fall short in others, by which means we may
discover that they did not act from knowledge,
but only from the disposition of their organs.
For while reason is a universal instrument which
can serve for all contingencies, these organs
bove need for some special adaptation for every
particular action. From this it follows that it
is morally impossible that there should be
sufficient diversity in any machine to allow it
to act in all the events of life in the same way
as our reason causes us to act.
Animals thus differ radically from humans in their
capacities, as we look at humans from the following
perspective
:
For it is a very remarkable fact that there are
none so depraved and stupid, without even
excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange
different words together, forming of them a
statement by which they make known their
thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no
other animal, however perfect and fortunately
circumstanced it may be, which can do the same.
It is not the want of organs that brings this to
pass, for it is evident that magpies and parrots
are able to utter words just like ourselves, and
yet they cannot speak as we do, that is, so as
to give evidence that they think of what they
say . ^
A potential counterargument has to be discussed,
before we can make conclusions on the basis of the
linguistic difference between humans and beasts:
And we ought not to confound speech with natural
movements which betray passions and may be
imitated by machines as well as be manisfested
20
by animals; nor must we think, as did some of
the ancients, that brutes talk, although we do
not understand their language. For if this were
true, since they have many organs which are
our own, they could communicate their
thoughts to us just as easily as to those of
their own race.
Only at this point of the discussion does
Descartes give us the rationale for his discussion of the
differences in the use of language noted between for
example apes and human beings:
there is none [error] which is more effectual in
leading feeble spirits from the straight path of
virtue, than to imagine that the soul of the
brute is of the same nature as our own, and that
in consequence, after this life we have nothing
to fear or to hope for, any more than the flies
and ants. As a matter of fact, when one comes to
know how greatly they differ, we understand much
better the reasons which go to prove that our
soul is in its nature entirely independent of
the body, and in consequence that it is not
liable to die with it.
The language argument is thus supposed to support
another one of Descartes' claims, namely the claim that
mind and body are separated from each other in humans and
that the mind - unlike the body - is immortal. Cartesian
dualism is based on the conception that bodies, of humans
and beasts, are machines whose behavior is explicable in
purely mechanistic terms. This comes out quite clearly in
the following paragraph taken from a letter from Descartes
to the Marquess of Newcastle:
21
But I observe that they [the beasts; G.W.] onlyimitate or surpass us in those of our actions
which are not guided by our thoughts ... In
fact, none of our external actions can show
anyone who examines them that our body is notjust a self-moving machine but contains a soul
thoughts, with the exception of words, or
other signs that are relevant to particular
topics without expressing any passion.
Beasts do not show any behavior, however, which
would force one to engage in an explanation that goes
beyond the mechanism involved in the physical movements of
humans and beasts. In particular we do not find any
behavior that forces us to postulate thought in animals.
Once this result is established it follows
straightforwardly from the results obtained in the Second
Mediatation that animals cannot have an immortal soul
(mind), because the essence of the soul is thinking. In
other words, whatever has a soul should therefore be
thinking (in the broad sense of the notion as it is used
by Descartes) , and by modus tollens it follows that animals
cannot have a soul, if they do not have thoughts:
Similarly, all the things which dogs, horses,
and monkeys are taught to perform are only
expressions of their fear, their hope, or their
joy; and consequently they can be performed
without any thought. Now it seems to me very
striking that the use of words, so defined is
something peculiar to human beings . . . But there
has never been known an animal so perfect as to
use a sign to make other animals understand
something which expressed no passion . . . This
seems to me a very strong argument to prove that
22
the reason why animals do not speak as we do is
not that they lack the organs but that they have
no thoughts
.
This is the textual evidence that we will base our
discussion on in this section. I will now try to give a
more formal representation of the argument, in order to
bring out its logical form. This will be of help to us in
the upcoming discussion about the claims made by Descartes
and their philosophical and empirical foundations.
2.2 The Argument
From now on I will assume that due to the textual
evidence given in the last subsection we are justified in
attributing belief in the following proposition to
Descartes
:
(A) for all X <X can pass the language test iff X has a
rational mind)
On the basis of (A) we can also attribute the
following propositions to Descartes:
<B) for all X (if X can pass the language test then X
has
a rational mind)
23
<C) for all X <if X has a rational mind then X can pass
the language teat)
We will refer to (B) as '‘Descartes' discovery
procedure for minds"
.
Bsfor® we go into the details of the argument
about the language test, we have to mention one
presupposition of the argument, namely: the argument for
the human mind presupposes the assumption that there is a
physiological parallel between man's articulatory
faculties and those of animals. That is why Descartes
brings the argument concerning the parrots. From the
behavior of those animals we can conclude that no
mechanical failure on the side of the animals is
responsible for their failure to pass the language test,
for these beasts are evidently able to imitate man's
articulatory behavior to large enough an extent for them
to be able to pass the language test as far as basic
physiological requirements go.
2
I will now give the structure of Descartes'
argument that there is a difference between humans and
animals in two versions, from two different perspectives,
as well as I understand it:
Descartes argues that since no animal can pass the
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language test, no animal has a rational mind. The
test is supposed to prove that animals do not possess
a faculty (language) which presupposes thought. But
since thought is the essence of the human mind, humans are
essentially different from animals. Ultimately, the
language test is an argument for Cartesian dualism.
Or, from a different perspective: Descartes
presupposes that the linguistic differences between beasts
and humans are not due to physiological constraints of
beasts, since there are beasts which can utter words etc.
and on the other hand there are humans (mutes) who cannot
speak but still use language. Furthermore, the behavior of
animals and the behavior of humans not dependent on
thought can possibly by imitated by a complicated machine,
i.e. in a mechanistic fashion. But since the human faculty
for speech is creative (i.e. not dependent on specific
dispositions)
,
no mechanistic explanation for this
behavior will be possible. The difference between animals
and humans thus cannot reduce to a difference in
mechanical complexity, i.e. a quantitative difference. The
difference thus has to be qualitative, i.e. due to a new
substance in man, which Descartes calls mind.
Given this outline of the argument I will now turn
to a discussion of a set of empirical facts concerning
human language and animal communication systems. The
questions I will try to find an answer to are: Is there
any reason to believe that <A) (and hence (B) which
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follows from it) is true? Depending on the answer to this
question, what would count as empirical evidence one way
or the other? Furthermore, what are the truth conditions
for the antecedent of Descartes' discovery procedure for
minds, i.e. under what conditions would we say that an
object X can pass the language test? This latter question
is of particular importance, when we try to apply the
language test to some arbitrary object, i.e. an infant of
three weeks of age, a computer of the latest generation,
animals, the tape recorder of the phone directory etc.
2.3 Language
We will begin this section with a discussion of
certain facts about animal communication systems which
might call into question Descartes' claim that the
language test is a sufficient condition for an object to
qualify as a bearer of a rational mind. I will first
describe in some detail the linguistic capabilities of two
apes, Washoe and Sarah. These capabilities we will then
compare with the Cartesian claims made in the quotes given
in section 1. above. Furthermore, it will become clear
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that we will need criteria for a decision whether some
object passes the language test or not.
3
Washoe is a chimpanzee who was taught language by
the two psychologists R.A. Gardner and B.T. Gardner. The
language taught was a rudimentary version of American Sign
Language <ASL), since the articulatory organs of apes make
them incapable of acquiring and using language through the
auditory-vocal channel. The earliest stages of Washoe's
language acquisition were reportedly similar to those of a
young human child. Washoe acquired more than one hundred
linguistic signs (words) and used two and three-word
utterances. The ape never acquired the word-order
restrictions of the language taught, but reportedly showed
a remarkable creativity through the invention of new
words, like "water-bird" for a duck etc. To sum up: Washoe
never acquired word order restrictions and sentences with
more than three words; her language did not show any signs
of structure dependence (cf. discussion below), and she
herself did not display any drive to communicate once she
had been released to an ape colony.
Sarah was a chimpanzee under the supervision of
David Premack. She was kept in a cage and was trained with
methods similar to Skinner's experiments with rats. Her
"words" consisted of little colored metal plates of
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different shapes. A red quadrangle, for example, meant
banana" etc. Sarah was able to acquire more than one
hundred such words and was able to follow among others
i^~then statements, like "if apple, then chocolate", i.e.
you will get chocolate (her favorite food, used as a
reinforcement), only if you take the apple first. Sarah
never started conversations and was just tested in her cage,
being drilled very carefully for very specific responses.
The sign system that Sarah was able to acquire was also
taught successfully to heavily mentally disturbed human
children who had been incapable of acquiring human
language. To sum up: Sarah, like Washoe, was able to
acquire more than one hundred signs after several years of
extensive drilling with reinforcement. Sarah's
communication displayed a certain amount of creativity,
but she never started a conversation on her own.'^
On the basis of these empirical facts about two
relatively sophisticated systems of animal communication
we can now return to Descartes' claims about the
linguistic capabilities of animals on which the arguments
for a mechanistic explanation of all animal behavior and
the existence of the human mind are based
.
In the Discourse we find for example the claim
that an animal-machine "could never arrange its words
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differently so as to answer to the sense of all that is
said in its presence, which is somethig even the most
backward men can do“
. It seems to me that we are not
refine this judgement on the basis of the
linguistic performance of the two apes discussed, even if
the ape's performance might have been more sophisticated
than one might have expected. If their behavior is
qualitatively analogous to the highest degree of
sophistication that animal communication systems are able
to attain, then the high level of creativity and
flexibility required by Descartes is certainly beyond
their reach. But the claim made by Descartes a few lines
down in the Discourse seems no longer tenable, given the
evidence from Washoe and Sarah: "For it is very remarkable
that there are no men so backward and so stupid . . . who
are unable to arrange various words and to put together
discourse through which they make their thoughts
understood; but on the other hand, there is no other
animal, perfect and well bred as it may be, that can do
likewise," The latter sentence is certainly false.
Although the animals we were looking at were not really
active communicants in the sense that they were looking for
communication and started conversations, still it cannot
bo denied that both Washoe and Sarah were capable of
arranging "various words and to put together
29
discourse" .
5
I think that the evidence from Washoe and Sarah
also does not force us to accept the claim that "animals
speak, although we do not understand their language",
although we might try to establish a better rationale for
the rejection of this claim than the one given by
Descartes, who just says that since animals and humans
share several organs, humans should also be able to
understand animals' speech, if animals are able to
understand each other. It seems to mo that the obvious
argument for this conclusion is clearly invalid. From the
fact that two computers have the same hardware it
certainly doesn't follow that a command given to one
computer has the same effect as if it were given to the
other one, for the two computers might be run with
different software, one of which is compatible with the
specific command, while the other one isn't, or if both
are compatible with the command, still the command might
lead to different effects depending on the software of the
computer. The whole issue obviously centers around the
meaning of the word "speak". Of course one can impose such
a general meaning onto this word that almost every
behavior falls under the concept, like scratching one s
head or losing leaves in the case of a tree. I admit that
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it is a matter of taste what one takes to be the defining
characteristics of speech, after all one already hears
sentences like ’’this machine speaks'* etc., but I am rather
sympathetic with a concern articulated by David Premack:
We find considerable evidence for
representational capacity, for the ape's ability
to use one thing to stand for another, and even
some evidence for spontaneous symbolization. But
we find very little of the latter, and it is
troublesome for me to find the evidence for the
existence of a capacity along with so little
evidence for the use of the capacity.
(Piattelli-Palmarini 1980, 180f)
In a sense Premack's concern is not relevant, since not
making use of a capacity does not mean that one doesn't
have the capacity. For example, I assume that all healthy
humans have the capacity to stand on a chair with one leg
while putting the right hand at the left ear. Despite this
principled capability one hardly sees humans make use of
this capacity, at least I haven't seen any so far. The
reason for this might be that humans just do not feel a
need for exploiting this capacity, and the same seems to
be true for chimpanzees as far as their capacity to forms
strings of words is concerned: it seems they just do not
feel a need to use their capacity and there is no
principled reason why they should do so, according to
Premack
:
31
People emphasize social communication in
discussing language, yet social communication
can get on nicely without language. <op cit)
I believe that this point strongly supports my claim in
the last footnote that the ability to speak, if one
chooses to call it that, in chimpanzees is of a quite
different quality than in humans. Humans feel the need to
use language, indeed we can quote the psychologist Jacques
Mehler saying that language is "the characteristic
instrument of mankind”, it is a fundamental aspect of
human nature. Even if one accepts that chimpanzees share
with severely aphasic humans the capacity of very basic
semiotic and referential acts, still there is an
unbridgeable qualitative gap between the language use of
humans and that of higher primates.
Having discussed the status of the chimpanzees'
linguistic performance, we should now return to a
discussion of the proposition (B) that we attributed to
Descartes. I repeat the proposition here for convenience:
<B) for all X <if X can pass the language test, then X has
a rational mind)
Wo can certainly give an instantiation of <B),
where Washoe or Sarah is put into the sentence for the
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variable X:
<B') if Washoe can pass the language test, then Washoe has
a rational mind
What we are interested in, of course, is whether from <B')
we can conclude (D)
:
<D) Washoe has a rational mind
by modus ponens applied to (B') and the antecedent of
<B'). If <B'
)
and the antecedent of <B') are true, then
(D) follows. We had assumed that Descartes would hold (B)
and we can assume that he would hold its instantiation
(B' )
.
But would he hold that the antecedent of <B') is
true? The problem is difficult to solve, since he does not
give any criteria for when an object has the property of
passing the language test. For him, this seems to have
been an intuitive decision, i.e. I suspect that when
pressed for such criteria he would have replied that he
considered X to have passed the language test, if he saw
clearly and distinctly that this object was using
language. And for Descartes everything that he saw clearly
and distincly was true, as proved at the end of the Fifth
Meditation
.
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The problem here is of course that it is far from
clear from an a priori point of view, whether Washoe is
using language or not. The intuitive decision is not of
much help, since as Leibnitz remarked, we do not have
clear criteria for when we see something clearly and
distinctly either, so that we never get out of the vicious
circle
.
To get out of this dilemma, I now want to discuss
a list of properties which have been taken to be essential
to human language. We will filter out certain of the
properties, since they do not really qualify for essential
properties of human language but will then apply these
properties to the structure of the sign systems and the
use they were put to by Sarah and Washoe. We will also
give examples of natural animal communication systems
which share certain of the properties with human language.
By 'natural systems' I means systems which were not taught
to animals by humans in laboratory experiments and did not
involve artificial languages invented by humans
specifically for these or other means. We will not find
any such system, however, that shares all the properties
with human language.
Hockett (1963) has proposed several essential
properties of human language. We will pick out some of
these properties and discuss their relevance. The
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properties are the following:
e) vocal-auditory channel
f) arbitrariness of signs/convention
g) semanticity
h) cultural transmission
i) displacement
k) duality
l) structure-dependence
m) creativity
The first property that is attributed to human
language is the use of the vocal-auditory channel. But we
do not even have to check whether non-human communication
systems have this property, since this can hardly be
claimed to be an essential property even for human
language. We can remember that already Descartes takes
into account usage of sign systems by human mutes. If we
would attribute a high degree of relevance to the
vocal-auditory channel, then we would have to make special
and I believe counterintuitive assumptions about users of
American Sign Language etc. I will not pursue this track
then and will not base any argument on this first property
of human language.
The second property refers to a property of the
information carrying units of the language, the signs. It
has been known for a long time that the sign is composed
of two entities, a form and a substance. In the Cartesian
tradition Arnauld, for example, gives exactly this
analysis of the sign in the Port-Royal logic. But he goes
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on
:
Signs may be divided into natural signs and
conventional signs. Natural signs do not depend
on the whim of man ~ an image in a mirror is a
natural sign of the person mirrored. A
conventional sign is a sign established by
convention and may* but need not* have any
connection with the thing signified. Words are
conventional signs of thoughts* and written
characters are conventional signs of words.
(Arnauld <1964* 47))
The important insight of this paragraph may
perhaps best be illustrated with an example. Take the
English word "boot". This word consists of one morpheme
(smallest meaningful linguistic unit) which consists of an
ordered set of three phonemes (smallest distinctive sound
unit)* namely /b/* /u/ and /t/ . But there is is no
intrinsic relationship between the meaning of the word
'boot" and this specific ordered set of phonemes. The
English speech community might as well have chosen a
different set of phonemes to make up the morpheme and the
word "boot"* or might have imposed a different order on
the phonemes* i.e. /tub/ rather than /but/. Another way to
demonstrate that the relationship between the form of a
sign and its content is arbitrary is to give the different
forms of synonymous signs in different languages: German
for example does not use the phoneme sequence /but/ to
signal the content of the English word /but/* but rather
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uses the phoneme sequence /stifl/, which is neither more
nor less suited to signal the meaning of the two words
than its English analogue. And if we go to other languages
we will presumably find again different phoneme sequences
for the same content. This is what we mean by
"arbitrariness of signs'*.^
The arbitrariness of signs may or may not be due to
convention. The signs of human languages are to a large
extent conventional in the sense that specific
form-content relationships are not part of the biological
endowment of human beings. That /but/ in English and
/stifl/ in German stand for the same sign content,
excludes the claim that maybe the relationship between the
meaning of /but/ and the form it is correlated with in one
language is innate. Rather each speech community agrees in
correlating the respective form with a certain content (in
this case the content of /but/ and /stifl/), and thus
brings into existence a convention. We will see in a
moment that there are animal communication systems whose
signs are arbitrary but not conventional.
We now have to ask ourselves whether we know of
animal communication systems whose signs have the property
of arbitrariness and if there are such systems, what the
source of the arbitrariness is. The first question seems
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to require a clear yes. Doves communicate with each other
through bodily movements and gestures and the relationship
between the form of the gestures and their content is
arbitrary, as far as we know. So, in order to express
®9*^®ssivity doves turn away from their enemy and start
picking grass with their beak. This is a sign as good as
any and it is certainly not obvious why turning away from
one's enemy and starting to pick grass signals agressivity
rather than shyness, hunger or unwillingness to fight.
Dove communication thus seems to satisfy the property
"arbitrariness of signs” that wo have attributed to human
languages. But does it also satisfy the requirement that
the signs are conventional; in other words, is it
thinkable that different dove communities chose different
forms of signs for the same content in analogy to the
English speech community's choosing /but/ to signal the
content of this sign whereas the Gorman speech community
chooses /stifl/? This does not seem to bo the case. The
signs that we find in natural animal communication systems
(i.e. systems not taught to animals in the laboratory, but
rather systems used in freedom without artificial
drilling and reinforcement) seem to be species-universal,
i.e. non-convontional ; at least I am not familiar with a
single description of an example in the literature on
natural animal communication which would posit, for
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example, different warning cries for the same danger
within one species. If this is correct and further
research in this area does not unearth examples like this,
then we have found a first distinctive diagnostic for
human languages, namely convention.
The third property assigned to human language is
"semanticity" , i.e. the fact that signs contain meaning
and the exchange of such signs conveys information, for
example sentences can be true or false. That natural
languages have this property is obvious and no further
discussion is called for. But animal systems might also
have this property. We saw above in the discussion of
arbitrariness that the dove gestures have a certain
content, namely agressivity. At this point we might be
tempted to reformulate Hockett's property slightly by
requiring that the semantic content of the signs used has
to be variable in certain ways, i.e. agressivity (which
3ust means "I am agressive now and here") is not abstract
enough a content, for it only refers to a behavioral state
of the signaling animal, but agressivity can not be said
to be true or false. I am trying to make Hockett's
requirement stricter for the following reason: Imagine a
Martian scientist coming down to earth, not knowing that
the entities on this planet fall into two classes, i.e.
the organic and the inorganic parts of the world. Then
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imagine that the Martian observes that the sky is
sometimes without clouds and is sometimes filled with
clouds. Furthermore, most of the time that the sky has
been filled with clouds, it started to rain afterwards.
The Martian scientist will, if s/he (or it?) is rational,
postulate a causal chain between the two states of
affairs, i.e. the fact that the sky is cloudy and the fact
that it starts to rain afterwards. He might thus take the
cloudy sky for a sign of potential upcoming rain. We may
further assume that the Martian at some point comes to
investigate doves, although he doesn't know that these
entities belong to the organic part of the world. Suppose
that the doves are displeased by the outlook of the
Martian which makes them agressive every time he
approaches them. He will then notice that each time he
approaches a dove it turns away from him and starts to
pick grass with its beak. Given that at first he doesn't
know how to interpret this behavior he moves toward the
dove and tries to touch it. But most of time he is then
attacked by the agressive dove, which tries to peck him
with its beak and to scratch him. Again, if he is rational
he might contruct a causal chain between the dove's first
turning away from him and picking grass with its beak and
then attacking him. In this sense the first behavior of
the dove might be taken as a sign for what is to come, in
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the same way that the cloudiness of the sky is a sign of
upcoming i*ain. If we now come back to our property of
semanticity p we see that the dove^s behavior is not really
semantic in any interesting sense, or at least not in a
more interesting sense than the cloudiness of the sky. The
signs used by the dove are only semantic in a causally
behavioral sense, but human languages are of course
semantic in a much more extended sense. Take the following
trivial example: ’’The sky is blue”. This sentence has a
meaning independent of any behavioral criteria and it can
be true or false. I can utter this sentence in a
conversation about colors or when I am talking about the
flowers in my garden or when I want to check how long it
takes me to utter a meaningful sentence with four
syllables. In none of these cases is the meaning of the
complex sign in any way related (or at least does not
have to be related) to behavior, neither mine nor
anybody else's.
If we turn to the bee dance with its increased
creativity relative to dove gestures, it seems we still do
not find semanticity comparable in any sense to that we
witness in human languages. I would interpret the
semantics of the bee dance in the following fashion,
analogous to the expressions of doves and the cloud
example: "If you fly into this direction about that far.
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then you will find food". If this is the correct
interpretation of the signal given by the dancing bee,
then we see again that this act of communication is just
the correlation of two states of affairs, i.e. the
behavior of two objects in the world, here the other bees
looking for food and the blossom carrying food. As far as
we know information that is not linked to behavioral
^ j-®POsi tions is not expressed by bee language and
presumably for principled reasons: it is not
expressible .
^
all this is true, then we have found a second
property of human languages which is not found in animal
communication systems.
Cultural transmission is very closely related to
the problem of convention. If the relationship between
linguistic form and linguistic meaning is conventional,
then it can change, either because one generation changes
it or because later generations slightly modify the
conventions passed on to them by earlier generations, for
example, to accomodate them to their more modern needs. We
can thus assume that those aspects of human language which
are conventional are open to change through time and we
know well that this is true. English and High German, for
example, are different in that High German underwent the
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second Germanic sound shift whereas English was not
affected by this rule change. West Germanic thus developed
in two different fashions in the Germanic generations who
lived from 500 - 800 after Christ depending on the
geographical distribution of the Germanic peoples.
It is hard to settle the question whether animal
communication shows cultural transmission in this sense.
What comes closest to fullfilling the relevant conditions
is a species of song birds with a species-specific song.
If this song is not entirely innate (i.e. birds raised in
isolation can perform the song) , but the young bird needs
to hear the song from other members of the species before
it can sing the song, then this is certainly a kind of
cultural transmission. This case might still not be
entirely convincing, since one would also like to know
whether the different generations can make slight changes
in the structure of the song melody. In other words I do we
find historical sound change in bird songs? If we do, then
I tliink we are dealing with a case of cultural
transmission, if we don't however, then I think the
question is still open. Since I am not familiar with any
evidence one way or the other, I will simply leave the
question open.
We now turn to the issue of displacement. By this
the property of every human communication systemwe mean
43
that allows its user to talk about objects and events
which are not related to the speakers, the place and the
time of the current speech act, i.e. the existence of
sentences like the following I "If my brother went to New
York tomorrow, I might meet Bill" or "Life on the Earth
must have been pretty unpleasant two billion years ago".
Displacement seems to be unique to human language.
Wq are not familiar with any natural animal communication
system that allows animals to transfer information that is
not linked to the communicants, the location of the
communication and the time of the act of communication.
The dove gestures are linked to behavioral dispositions
depending on the individual dove, the time and place of
the gesture, i.e. no dove can signal the fact that some
other dove is agressive etc. The warning cries of birds
and apes are linked closely to the location and the time
of the cry (although the chimpanzee Sarah made
"utterances" about objects not linked closely to the
location of the communication in experimental situations
(Premack: "Sarah was capable of displacement")), we do not
seem to find cries signaling the fact that three weeks ago
an enemy was approaching, or a cry telling the mates of
the Warner that his mother was once attacked by some
vicious enemy. Bird songs, to the extent that they show
semanticity, are also closely linked to the time of the
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comnuini.ca'b i ve actir^ at Isast w© havsn't heard of cries
making it known that the communicant once was looking for
a female to found a family. For all these reasons
displacement can be used as a true and interesting
diagnostic for human communication systems.
Duality is a property of the structure of human
language rather than of the use of language, like
displacement. It embodies the idea that in the hierarchy
of linguistic units there exists a level below which
significant units are no longer composed of meaningful
units. Thus, whereas sentences of natural languages are
sets of phrases, which are meaningful, and phrases are
sets of words and words have meaning, the units that words
themselves are composed of are in fact the smallest
meaningful linguistic units. These units are commonly
referred to as 'morphemes' and as was mentioned above ,
the phoneme is defined as the smallest distinctive sound
unit of language (this is only one of the definitions
around, but it does its job as well as others). There
exists an interesting relationship between the hierarchy
of linguistic units and their frequency, i.e. the phoneme
inventory which is relatively low on the hierarchy is
finite and in fact quite small: in natural language we do
not find more than one hundred phonemes. The elements
composed out of phonemes, the morphemes are more numerous
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than the first, there are several thousand, but it seems
not more than ten thousand. From then on the language is
enriched by productive word and phrase formation rules
which ensure that there are infinitely many words, phrases
and sentences in every human language. By duality we thus
mean the fact about human language that there is a level
in the hierarchy of linguistic building blocks where we
move from signs to non-signs, i.e. there is a lowest level
significant units which is no longer composed of
significant units and the latter class of non-significant
units is very small.
It is not obvious whether we should attribute
duality to animal communication systems. Can we say, for
example, that the melody of a bird song that is composed
of meaningless units (the individual tones) is itself a
meaningful unit? Do we find anything in the bird song
melody that resembles the highly articulated structures of
phrases of human languages, let alone the hierarchy of
units forming the whole? Do we find a frequency hierarchy?
The same questions come up in connection with the bee
dance. Everybody who observes the bee dance is thrilled by
its relevance and its social coordination, but is there
any remarkable similarity between the structure of bee
dance communication and the structure of human language?
Would we want to say that the different movements of the
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dancing bee are meaningless, but that the composition of
the movements is transferring information. I guess we
would be inclined to do so. But we do not seem to find
any hierarchy of meaningful units with clear rules of how
to produce larger units, with a corresponding absence of a
frequency hierarchy. In fact, upon closer investigation it
seems clear that the expressibility of bee ‘’language" is
not too rich after all, since the amount of different
pieces of information expressible in bee language is
actually quite small. Abstracting away from the trivial
fact that the number of directions in which one bee can
send the others is of course theoretically infinite, the
variation of information expressible in bee language is
highly restricted. We will come back to this question when
we discuss structure dependence. To sum up the discussion
wo can say that wo do find modest duality in some animal
systems, but that the amount of duality compared to the
linguistic systems used by humans is rather restricted.
Another structural property inherent in human
languages is structure dependence itself. By this we moan
the fact that rules of natural languages do not seem to bo
defined on the basis of strings of words found in a
phonetic string, but rather over abstract phrases defining
the highly articulated internal structure of sentences of
human languages. We can demonstrate structure dependence
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with an example similar to the ones Chomsky has used
during the last twenty years to argue for the concept.
Imagine a human child and a Martian visitor trying to
aquire English on the basis of listening to every-day
linguistic material around them and uttering such material
themselves. This essentially is the task of language
acquisition that most human children undergo successfully,
i.e, the child (unlike Washoe and Sarah) is not under
constant supervision of his parents or even psychologists
in his/her utterances and no intensive training with
reinforcement etc. is going on. Imagine now that the child
and the Martian who, for simplicity, we can assume to be
exposed to exactly the same linguistic data, hear a
sentence like the following:
<M) The dog is sick
Our speakers might know that this is a declarative
sentence, i.e. a sentence expressing a statement.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that both notice a
similarity both in meaning and in structure to the
sentence
<N) Is the dog sick?
48
We know it to be an empirical fact that children know
quite early the difference between a statement and a
question. At some point in the lanquaqe acquisition
process we can thus presuppose the knowledge that (N) is
the question inquiring whether <M) is true. Since the
child is certainly aware of other such example pairs,
he/she as well as our poor Martian will try to formulate a
rule that relates sentences like <M) and <N), since he/she
cannot store all the infinitely many pairs like <M) and
(N) in his/her finite memory. If one assumes that the
child and the Martian learn language inductively, then one
will assume that both will (unconsciously) formulate
certain hypotheses about the relationship between CM) and
(N) . The simplest hypothesis compatible with <M,N) is
certainly (H)
:
(H) The yes-no question a belonging to a declarative
sentence b is exacly like b with one exception! the
first finite verb in b appears as the initial verb of
the question a
We can compare (H) with a more complicated hypothesis,
namely <H' )
!
<H') The yes-no question g belonging to a declarative
49
sentence b is exactly like b with one exception:
the first finite verb after the first noun ghrase
in b appears as the initial verb of the question a
<H') differs from <H) in that the underlined
phrase is added. This clearly makes the second hypothesis
more complicated than the first one. (H) and (H'
)
differ
radically in what they require from a lanquaqe learner.
The first rule just requires the learner to identify the
first finite verb of the sentence (which is already a
non~trivial task, but we will ignore this question here),
that is all. The second condition requires much more. It
requires a structural analysis of (M)
,
because in the
underlined expression reference is made to the first noun
phrase of the declarative sentence. But a noun phrase is
an abstract unit of sentence structure that does not
correlate with anything in the sound wave carrying for
example <M) . A linear sequence of words without an abract
structure imposed on it is thus not going to help the
language learner to apply rule (H') correctly.
I have stressed the fact that hypothesis (H'
)
is
more complex than hypothesis (H)
.
In fact, this increased
complexity is warranted, however, since <H') is the
correct generalization about the relation between
sentences like (M) and (N)
.
This can be shown with the
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following examples which are slightly more complicated
than <M) and <N)
;
<0) The dog that is lying under the table is sick
The correct yes-no question belonging to (0) is <P') which
is in accord with (H^ ) and not (P) as predicted by (H)
!
<P) Is the dog that lying under the table is sick?
<P‘') Is the dog that is lying under the table sick?
The dashes in the two versions of <P) mark the positions
that <H) and (H^) identify as the first finite verb
with the qualification in <H') that the first finite verb
after the first noun phrase is meant. We can now conclude
that from a purely inductive point of view, without the
presupposition that the sentences of human languages have
highly articulated abstract structures, it would not be
irrational to postulate the simpler hypothesis <H) before
the more complicated (H'). Only after <H) is falsified,
would one expect a language learner not equipped with the
knowledge about structure to postulate <H'). We would thus
have some reason to believe that our rational Martian
friend in his inductive trial -and-error search for the
rules of English would utter incorrect sentences like <P) .
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However, this is not what we find with human children.
According to the results of a recent experiment by Crain
and Nakayama <cf. Crain/Nakayama 1984) children never make
mistakes like <P) . More than 60 children down to a very
small age have been tested and no utterances like <P)
could be detected. From this Chomsky concludes that it is
part of the linguistic faculty of man, i.e. Universal
Grammar, that all rules of natural language are
structure-dependent. That is to say: we do not find rules
of natural language syntax which are defined in terms of
unstructured strings of linguistic objects.
Turning to animal communication again, we may note
that no system is known to us whose rules are
structure-dependent in the sense just discussed. Bird
songs and warning cries of apes do not display anything
like the structural descriptions in (H'), indeed the
information units in these systems do not seem to consist
of hierarchically structured smaller building blocks at
all. A compositionality principle for these systems is
thus not required. Moreover, it is not even easy to see
why the animal systems should contain structure-dependence
in the first place, since structure-dependence is a
property of rules of grammar. Grammars of human languages
will require this property, since they contain rules,
which apply to strings of words with structure
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superimposed on them. It is not equally plausible to
assume that animal systems contain rules in the first
place. At least I would be very startled to learn that an
animal system had been detected in which we find pairs
like (M) and <N) in the first place. In other words: the
systems we are talking about seem to be so rigid, that
they do not allow alternations like statement - question
etc. The bee dance does not seem to invoke a question -
answer sequence, i.e. an incoming bee isn't confronted
with a dance signaling the question: "Did you find an
interesting flower in the vicinity of the hive and what's
its color?”. The only illocutionary acts that bees are
capable of seem to be statements. Questions, commands,
exclamations, promisses, desires and all the other acts
that human languages have special signalling functions for
in their grammatical storage are simply lacking. But then
there is also no reason to expect the very complex and
fascinating alternations in these systems that we find in
human languages and no reason why rules should exist in
the systems. The absence of structure dependence may thus
be due to the inherent communicative rigidity of the
systems under discussion. We will pursue this point in the
discussion of the next property, creativity.
The explosive creativity is one of the most
fascinating and most important aspects of human language.
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If human languages consisted of a finite amount of
structures that could be stored in the memory of each
speaker, like, for example, the 64 syllogisms or the
multiplication table of integers smaller than or equal to
10, then human language would not be very interesting from
a scientific point of view and it would also lose its
importance for the human race as the vehicle of social
interaction, cultural transmission and the expression of
thought. With its infinitely many phrases and sentences
human languages are capable of expressing infinitely many
different thoughts. To give just one illustrative example.
Imagine a child is able to utter a sentence type like the
following: "Yesterday the old man hit the young dog hard"
and for each of the words in the sentence knows just nine
other words that could be substituted for this word. The
child will thus know 60 words, the vocabulary of a normal
human child under 3 years of age. With this very small
grammar the child will be able to utter almost one billion
different sentences!
One should not believe that the fact that the
dancing bee is also theoretically able to perform
infinitely many different dances (because one component of
the dance signals the angle with respect to the sun in
which the food will be found - of course there are
infinitely many such angles in theory) is relevant here.
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of oXXf it is almost csz*tain that ths bsss rscsiving
the information cannot distinguish between increasingly
similar angles, once, because it is dark in the hive
anyway and the receiving bees have to sense the structure
of the dance with their feelers, second because it is very
doubtful that the feelers can make such fine distinctions.
For all practical purposes there will thus be a very small
number of unprecise messages conveyed by the dancing bee.
To mention just one interesting fact: bee language does
not have word a for ’’above”: a bucket of sugar water put on
the hive of bee colony will not be accessible to the bee
swarm, since bees returning from the bucket into the hive
are unable to communicate the exact position of the
bucket. They signal that the food source is in the
vicinity of the hive, but, since there are no flowers in
the sky, the innate bee language vocabulary just lacks the
word "above”. The swarm will fly around in the vicinity of
the hive for hours looking for the rich source, but will
be unable to locate it on the basis of the directions.
Human languages differ fundamentally in this
respect. The child we attributed the very restricted
grammar to not only can distinguish each of the one
billion sentences, s/he will also be able to judge that
each of these sentences is grammatical and will be able to
compute the meaning of each of these completely novel
55
SQntGncss without having hoard it bofors. Moreover, human
children not only perceive and understand new and unheard
utterances all the time, they also compose new and unheard
sentences constantly, not only by filling in different
words into structures they have mastered (i.e. not just by
induction)
, but also by inventing new structures on the
basis of old structures that they have mastered, for
example, by composing two sub-structures into one new
structure etc. This amount of innovative creativity seems
to be entirely absent from all the animal communication
systems that we know at this point. A young bee cannot
just come along and add some personal note to a given
dance; the structure of the dance is entirely rigid, the
different steps are already programmed into the bee at
birth and creation and innovation are impossible.
After this rather long fact-finding excursion let
us now return to Descartes' language test and the criteria
for passing it. Rather than relying on our intuition, we
now have a set of clear and distinct diagnostics for X
can pass the language test": let us refer to the set of
properties discussed which are essential of human language
as k. Then we can say:
(E) for all X <X passes the language test iff X
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systematically displays behavior having the
properties k)
<E) incorporates the truth conditions for the
antecedent of <B) above. The conjunction of <E) and <B)
should therefore enable us to determine for every object
in the world, whether it has a rational mind or not. But
at this point we have to be very careful. We have to ask
the question whether we can really trust <B) and its
strengthened form in <A)
.
I believe we have made precise
the truth conditions for the antecedent of (B)
,
and this
is a first step toward a better understanding of (B) as a
whole. But what about the truth conditions of the
consequent? If we have found an object which makes (E)
true by systematically displaying behavior with the
properties k, an object ipso facto making the antecedent
of <B) true as well, what is it that we are predicating of
the object by claiming that it has a rational mind? Can we
be confident, given our characterization of the truth
conditions of the sentence "A passes the language test ,
that we are attributing to A a rational mind in the sense
that Descartes is using the term in the quotations in
section 2.1? I think not.
Our language test does not show that A has a
rational mind, i.e. that the essence of A is thinking, in
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Descartes' terms! What our language test really shows is
much weaker; it shows that if A passes the language test,
then A has a property which makes it capable of linguistic
behavior much like ours as human beings. We should not be
disappointed about that, however, since this is already a
very important result, especially, since <E) and <B) are
very formal and precise discovery procedures, even if they
do not show exactly what Descartes would have wanted them
to show, in case he had held them. We will use them as a
basis for our further discussion.
Let us recapitulate our results so far. We have
attributed the belief in propositions <A) and (B) to
Descartes. Descartes himself has not specified very
clearly the truth conditions for the antecedent of (B)
.
Therefore, we set out to find these truth conditions. We
have formulated these truth conditions very precisely in
<E) . But once the truth conditions for the antecedent of
<B) were formulated clearly we saw that something has to
be wrong with (A) . For, logically it is possible that one
can find an organism which does satisfy the language test
but does not display any other defining properties of
"rational mind", i.e. a mutation of man, call it "homo
loquens", which speaks exactly like we do, but is
principally incapable of our modes of imagination, whose
minds are incapable of logical reasoning and of other
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performances which we call intelligent, i.e. the use of
arithmetic, causality etc. I am sure that neither
Descartes nor we would be willing to attribute a rational
mind to members of this species. We thus have to give up
Descartes proposition <A)
!
But by no means do we have to
concede that our whole enterprise has failed. To the
contrary, having established very precisely under which
conditions an object passes the language test, we can can
use this result for the following purpose: let "property
U” stand for the mental property of man which allow every
member of this species to pass the language test. We can
then modify Descartes' <A) appropriately to CA*):
(A*) for all X (X can pass the language test iff X has
property U)
From this we can deduce <B»):
(B») for all X (if X can pass the language test, then X
has property U)
B* is still a discovery procedure, but this time
it discovers property U, rather than rational minds. This
is still a highly significant result, we believe, for
satisfaction of B* can be taken as a necessary condition
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for satisfying the discovery procedure for rational minds.
The discovery procedure for rational minds will in fact
not be a conditional sentence with an atomic sentence as
its antecedent at all, rather it will be a conditional
sentence with a conjunction of many different sentences as
the antecedent. In other words, our conception of rational
mind differs radically from Descartes in this respect: we
diverge from Descartes' conception of "rational mind" by
denying that the mind is a universal instrument of reason.
Rather, we believe that a rational mind is a combination
of many different capabilities, one of them being property
U. Other capabilities would be: the property of giving a
certain interpretation to visual perceptions, the property
of having free will and so forth.®
We are convinced that only those objects which have all
the properties just named and many more collectively will
pass the discovery procedure for rational minds. Passing
only one of these discovery procedures for the individual
properties, whichever one it is, or passing just a proper
subset of the relevant tests, will not suffice to pass the
discovery test for rational minds. Our final version of
this discovery procedure for rational minds is G:
<G) for all X <if X passes the tests Ti, 2 •••
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Tn» then X has a rational mind)
In this chapter we have specified only one of the tests
mentioned in the antecedent of (G )
,
namely the language
test. We are incapable of providing careful specifications
of the other tests* since we do not even know which other
capacities besides the language capacity U should be
definitive of a rational mind. We believe that the
capability of vision is one such property of rational
minds, and one could specify conditions for satisfying a
vision test on the basis of the work of David Hubei and
Torsten Wiesel, cf. Hubei and Wiesel (1962, 1978).
Furthermore, one will certainly want to require that an
object with a rational mind is capable of logical
inferences of some sort. One other component of a rational
mind would thus have to be some logic or other. These are
only random examples of properties which an object should
have to deserve the attribution of a rational mind, a
complete list is in principle possible, but presumably out
of the range of contemporary work in Cognitive Science.
But I believe that this is the only way of completing of
what one might call "the Cartesian program”, the program
of determining the properties of a rational mind. It is
unlikely that one will be able to determine on the basis
of one single capacity whether an organism has a rational
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mind or not. This is of course an empirical question which
cannot be answered on logical grounds alone and will need
further progress in all branches of the Cognitive
Sciences. In the final section of this chapter we will
give further arguments against Descartes' principle (A)
and in favor of our revised version of it.
2.4 Towards a definition of human nature
In section 2.3 we have argued that we should not
pursue the Cartesian methodology of search for rational
minds as we have formulated it in <A).^
Rather, we shoulcf analyze a rational mind as a mind which
has a whole array of capacities. One such capacity is
language for which we had defined a discovery procedure in
<B»). This is why we believe the formulation of <B») to be
of more interest than the formulation of (A)
:
once we have
found an object that satisfies (A) positively, we have an
object with a rational mind. But what does that mean? What
does it mean to have a rational mind? For Descartes the
extension of the property “being such that it has a
rational mind” was clear from the start: only humans were
supposed to have rational and immortal souls. Flies and
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3nts w©r0 not to b© ©quat©d with man* they weir© not
supposed to share the fears and hopes of what would happen
to them after life. All animals apart from man are just
machines according to Descartes and their behavior can be
described in purely mechanistic terms.
This is unsatisfactory. Presumably, Chomsky (1980)
expresses a common conviction of both the author of this
thesis and all of its readers when he writes: "Nobody
believes that bodies are Cartesian automata...". It is
therefore far from clear whether the notion "rational
mind" refers to anything at all apart from some
arbitrarily chosen set of properties, in fact the
properties tested by Ti .. Tn in (G) above. Who
shall decide whether it takes a passing of the language
test to qualify for a rational mind? What if we trade the
language capacity for a more sophisticated visual system?
Are w© giving up the notion "rational mind"? If yes, why?
Furthermore, does the capacity to acquire chess belong to
the necessary conditions for having a rational mind? If
yes, why? If not, why not? Even when one restricts
attention to the capacity of logical reasoning, one does
not get clear results. Which of the infinitely many logics
does one require? Will the propositional calculus do, or
shall one require a quantificational logic? Once this
ask further: do we need a modaldecision is made, one can
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logic? Can a being be rational, if it cannot handle
logical relations of time? etc.
It should be clear from this discussion that the question
"Which organisms have rational minds?" is meaningless as
long as the term "rational mind" has not been defined. But
even after the term has been defined, the question is not
necessarily very interesting, for the definition is of
course a nominal one and therefore arbitrary. In other
words, if somebody wants to exclude all animals other than
man from the class of organisms with a rational mind, then
s/he can give a nominal definition of "rational mind"
which will only allow humans and if s/he wants to prove
that the soda machine next to his/her office has a
rational mind, then s/he can also find a definition which
will do the 30b.
We will thus not pursue the question of rational
mindhood any further, since we consider it of little
interest. For us, the question what the real capacities of
humans and other animals are is much more interesting,
that is we want to know as precisely as possible what the
discrete components are that define human nature and we
want to know what other animals can do and what they
cannot do. Thus, the question which of the many tests of
<G) each organism can pass is the relevant question for
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us. Whether one takes the first fifteen of the capacities
checked by these tests as constitutive of the concept
"rational mind" or whether it takes thirty capacities or
maybe all, we do not find interesting, this is a purely
terminological matter and as irrelevant as the question
whether the government in some country should be called
fascist or conservative: the living conditions of the
people in this country are what counts and not the name we
give to the government. We might even choose to change the
name, but that does not mean that the living conditions of
the people change efficiently.
Let us now come back to proposition (B»). The
reason why we find (B*) very important is that it gives us
relevant information about human nature. <B*) is a
scientific hypothesis about part of the essence of man,
whether we choose to call man rational or not. If <B») is
correct, then it contributes substantially to humanistic
study. In this sense (B») is similar to (A) which also
tried to find a defining property of humanity. But there
is one important difference between the Cartesian (A) and
our Chomskyan <B»), a difference which Piatelli-Palmarini
<1980, 14) characterizes as follows:
Chomsky's linguistic program, in contrast to the
classical rationalist program in philosophy, is
a scientific research program and thus committed
to painstaking work on relevant data that can
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provide tests for the conjectures embedded in
the protective belt.
We believe that CB*) is still Cartesian in spirit. We
with Descartes that the human language faculty is
unique in the biological world. With Premack we believe
that chimpanzees show significant signs of intelligence
and a certain amount of communicative competence. But
there are no animals which show anything like the
sophisticated language competence of human children let
alone the drive for verbal communiction or most
importantly the drive to use language as an expression of
thought. With the psychologist Jacques Mehler the
uniqueness of the second-order capacity of acquiring a
natural language (the language acquisition device (LAD)
)
can thus be taken as a constitutive element of human
nature
:
In effect, the LAD would be the nucleus from
which language could become the characteristic
instrument of mankind. (Piatelli-Palmarini 1980,
345)
(B») is in the tradition of Descartes' (A) because
it, like (A), is a tool of the Cartesian quest for the
identity of man as a being with certain (mental)
capacities which distinguish him from other organisms. It
still clings to the Cartesian conception of mind as the
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thinking substance, where thinking is taken in a very
broad sense. The Cartesian revolution based on the method
of systematic doubt inquired into the essence of human
nature (“But I do not yet know clearly enough what I am,
I who am certain that I am" Meditation II) and the
relationship between the mind and the world around it. In
this Descartes is “virtually a contemporary figure"
(Gardner 19S5, 50)
.
That he remains a contemporary figure
is to a certain extent due to another revolution, the
Chomskyan revolution in linguistics with repercussions in
the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science. It
can hardly be an accident that the revivor of “Cartesian
linguistics" names the relationship between human nature
and the outside world as his main concern in the answer to
' an interview question:
As a linguist, I'm interested in discovering the
nature of human language and, more generally,
the nature of the human capacity for thought and
self-expression. As a person, I would like to
see a world fit for human beings... (quoted in
Otero (1981)
Cartesian Linguistics will be the main concern of
our last chapter.
footnotes of Chgeter II
1. One can even go further than Descartes in the passagequoted in claiming that humans can acquire languagedespite other intellectual deficiencies, cf . the following
remark by Chomsky:
What has been found over and over again is that
there seems to be a remarkable lack of
correlation between the development of basic
structural features of language and even very
severe impairments of other kinds of
intellectual ability, (in Piattelli-Palmarini
(1980,175)
2. Animals which are incapable of imitating man's
behavior are thus taught sign languages or
other modes of production in our days. We will come back
to this.
3. The discussion in this subsection is based to a large
extent on the very stimulating discussion of animal
communication systems in Aitchison (1976)..
4. For more information on the linguistic capabilities of
the two apes and more background information, cf
.
Gardner/Gardner (1969) on Washoe and Premack (1970, 1971,
1972) and Premack's paper in Piattelli-Palmarini (1980).
5. For our purposes it is of extreme importance that
Premack, the psychologist who taught Sarah, joined a group
of other researchers to teach a sign system very much like
the one that Sarah acquired to people with severe global
aphasia (people with a lesion in the language centers of
the brain with consequent total inability to acquire
normal language), cf. Glass/Gazzaniga/Premack (1975). We
will use this fact later as evidence in support of two
arguments: (a) Although chimpanzees are "very smart and
[have] all kinds of sensorimotor constructions (causality,
representational functions, semiotic functions ...)"
(Chomsky) , there is still a qualitative difference between
their ability to acquire language and normally functioning
humans; (b) Descartes' equivalence of language use and
mindhood of the language user is untenable. If a person
displays all the capacities which Descartes covers under
"thinking" while being unable to achieve the requirements
for normal language use, then passing the language test
cannot be a sufficient condition for having a rational
mind, as (B) claims. This very fact will ultimatly lead us
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to question the concept of a unified rational mind as a
whole
.
6. "What's in a name? That which we call rose by any other
nname would smell as sweet.” (Shakespeare, Romeo and
act 2)
7. We find ourselves in agreement with David Premack here,
who is also sceptical about the linguistic capabilities ofbees
:
While holding this relaxed view of language,
however, it is still questionable to consider
bee communnication as language, (in
Piattelli-Palmarini 1980, 212)
and
While we wait for the critical experiments to
demonstrate such an ability in the bee, we must
adopt an agnostic position with regard to the
language ability of bees; we must take the
position that the bee has a code, a correlation
between items inside and outside its body, not
necessarily a language . . . (op cit)
8. With thus picture of the mind we follow Fodor (1983)
who develops a modular conception of the mind.
9. We are slightly unfair to Descartes here, since
Descartes had in fact proposed at least two different
tests for the determination of an object with a rational
mind. It is unclear, however, whether Descartes considered
each of the tests to be necessary and sufficient
conditions for rational minds, or whether each is
necessary but only both together are sufficient. Even if
Descartes should have held the latter, we believe that
this test would be far from conclusive. Again, one can
easily imagine organisms which satisfy both conditions but
which we would still be reluctant to attribute a rational
mind to. There is no reason to believe that any one
capacity of a rational mind will be a sufficient condition
for rationality, and Descartes does not produce an
argument that this should be so.
It has been argued that there exists something
like "general intelligence”, cf . for example Hilary
Putnam's contribution to Piatelli-Palmarini (1980, chs.
14, 17). But Putnam's use of "general intelligence”, whose
conception might come closer to the Cartesian view of the
mind as a universal instrument of reason than ours, is so
vague that the notion “general intelligence" is almost
meaningless
.
CHAPTER III
Th« Study of Language
In this chapter we will deal with the study of
language » and especially the study of language fros the
perspective of what Chonsky has termed •’Cartesian
Linguistics'*. The first part of the chapter is devoted to
on outline of the construct "Cartesian Linguistics” and
the rest of the chapter will concentrate on the philosophy
of language of the philosopher and linguist Wilhelm von
Humboldt. There has been a debate in the literature over
whether v. Humboldt should be viewed as a Cartesian
Linguist as defined in the first part of the chapter. We
will engage in this debate and try to find textual
evidence in favor of and against the positions taken in
this debate.
3.1 Cartesian Linguistics
Cartesian Linguistics is a theoretical construct!
There has never been a coherent school of researchers
which would have termed themselves Cartesian Linguists.
This chapter is thus not about a well-defined group of
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people, neither chronologically nor locally. Carteaian
Linguistics as it will be described below is not dependent
on a certain age or geographical area. In fact, we sight
well argue that there have lived Cartesian linguists long
before Descartes revolutionized philosophy in the
seventeenth century; in particular the Indian gramsatical
tradition with the marvellous work on Sanskrit by Panini
and others more than 2 000 years ago is partly Cartesian,
as understood by us. Moreover, it is not clear that all
those aspects that we take to be definitional for
Cartesian linguistics would have been held by Descartes
himself. Surely, Descartes would not have agreed with the
position of Cartesian Linguistics that most of the
operations of our mind are not open to conscious
introspection. Here, for example, Cartesian linguistics
clearly and knowingly departs from the philosophical set
of doctrines held by Descartes.
Since "Cartesian Linguistics" is a technical term
with a very specific meaning, very much like the terms
"function" in set theory or "world" in formal semantics,
we will cling closely to the conception of Cartesian
linguistics that was put forth in Chomsky (1966), where
Chomsky enumerates certain intellectual positions which
are essential to Cartesian Linguistics. One could say that
the con 3unction of all those positions forms the nominal
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definlbion of Car'besian Linguistics.^
From this conception of Cartesian Linguistics it
already follows that it is a matter of degree rather than
absolute decision who counts as a Cartesian Linguist.
Since the defined term is a cover term for a family of
convictions, there is in principle no reason not to expect
that certain people will adhere to most, maybe all of
these positions, whereas others will pick out this one or
that one. Again, it is an empty enterprise to doubt that
someone is not a Cartesian Linguist because he adhered
only to 80 percent of the positions defining the
construct. This is very much like the quarrel over whether
a glass is half full or half empty. In our case study in
the second part of this chapter we will thus be interested
in whether v. Humboldt held several or many of the
positions which we take to be essential to Cartesian
Linguistics. If it turns out that he does, but only to a
certain degree, then the reader may decide for him/herself
whether s/he wants to refer to v . Humboldt as a Cartesian
linguist or not.
We thus have a very specific goal in this chapter,
are not trying to write an authoritative history of
linguistics and the philosophy of language, nor are we
trying to pick out one era to give an authentic account of
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the (philosophical) study of language in this ora. Rather
wo start in the twentieth century with certain aspects of
the study of language that we are interested in. Then we
go back in time to find ancestors in the sense of persons
who have held these positions. Chossky sakes this point
very clear in his book:
2
My prinary ain is simply to bring to the
attention of those involved in the study of
generative grammar and its implications some of
the little-*known work which has bearing on their
concerns and problems and which often
anticipates some of their specific conclusions.
(Chomsky 1966 » 2)
Let it be understood then* that neither we nor
Chomsky are attempting a historical account of the study
of language. Nor are wo interested in categorizing figures
as one hundred percent Cartesian Linguists or not. We take
as a starting point a number of intellectual positions
held by present day Generative Grammar and trace them back
in time* in this thesis to the first half of the
nineteenth century* the days of Wilhelm v. Humboldt.
Chomsky (1966) takes four main aspects to be
essential of Cartesian Linguistics: (a) Creative aspect of
language use* (b) Deep and surface structure; (c)
Description and explanation in linguistics and (d)
Acquisition and use of language. The second point is
self-explanatory for everyone familiar with the work of
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Generative Grammar during the last 30 years, so we will
not discuss it here.
We have seen in chapters 1 and 2 that Descartes
considered a mechanistic explanation for the linguistic
behavior of man impossible, since man knows how to react
appropriately linguistically in an indefinite amount of
situations. This sets man apart both from all other
animals and from machines:
we should always have two very certain tests by
which to recognise that, for all that, they were
not real men. The first is, that they could
never use speech or other signs as we do when
placing our thoughts on record for the benefit
of others. For we can easily understand a
machine's being constituted so that it can utter
words, and even emit some responses to action on
it of a corporeal kind, which brings about a
change in its organs; for instance, if it is
touched in a particular part it may ask what we
wish to say to it; if in another part it may
exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it
never happens that it arranges its speech in
various ways, in order to reply appropriately to
everything that may be said in its presence, as
even the lowest type of man can do. (116)
According to this paragraph, language functions as
a means for the expression of man's thought. Furthermore,
there is no upper bound to this expression of thought. We
saw in chapter 1 that Descartes believed that human
knowledge is severely constrained, e.g. a finite mind like
ours is in principle incapable of grasping infinite God in
his entirety. Attributing to man a finite mind with finite
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knowledge capable of reacting correctly in a linguistic
manner in an indefinite amount of situations means to
attribute to man the faculty to make infinite use of
finite means. Chomsky refers to this unbounded and
stimulus-free faculty of man as the "creative aspect of
ordinary language use”. This is thus the first defining
part of "Cartesian Linguistics".
The third defining aspect of Cartesian Linguistics
is "Description and Explanation in Linguistics".
Concerning the first part of this aspect we do not find
much in Descartes' work, since he paid little or no
attention to the analysis of natural language in his
philosophical and scientific work. The second part did
interest him, however, for this question is part of the
language test problem discussed in the previous chapter.
Wilson (1978) sums up our result of the previous chapter:
Descartes is maintaining that an immaterial soul
must be invoked to "explain" human language use,
because a strictly mechanistic account is
inconceivable. (183)
We will come back to the question whether a mechanistic or
behavioristic account of language acquisition is desirable
when we discuss the fourth defining property of Cartesian
lingustics. For the moment let us stick to the Cartesian
conviction that the existence of natural language is a
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phenomenon which needs an explanation in the first place.
Descartes postulated the non-material soul to account for
the fact that there is a species-specific uniform faculty
for using speech in a creative manner. Descartes himself
did not push the question what this uniform faculty that
allows man to acquire and use natural language might
consist of. This was only done later when the idea of
Universal or Philosophical Grammar emerged, the idea that
all grammars of natural languages have certain aspects in
common and that all members of the human species are
equipped with this knowledge.
The last point that we will discuss is in fact
related to the previous one: aquisition and use of
language. Again, Descartes did not fill out the frame of
the discussion that he set off with his language test
argument. But in the first chapter we have discussed
Descartes' theory of knowledge which is very close to
Plato's theory in "Meno” and "Phaidon”, i.e. the claim is
made that learning is recollection of what the soul had
already contained in it. Descartes postulated the
oxistence of innate ideas in the soul, ideas which are not
very concrete but rather represent a faculty of the mind
to analyze data from the external world in a predetermined
fashion. This idea was later developed in the Cartesian
tradition and applied to knowledge of language. We will
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thus take ths following formulation of it to ba
constitutiva of Cartesian Linguistics: learning a language
is not a mechanistic enterprise. Rather, the human mind is
equipped with a second-order faculty which enables it to
analyze lingustic data received by the senses in certain
ways which allow it to structure the received information
and to develop the first-order capability of producing and
understanding an infinite amount of grammatical structures
of his natural language. We call the set of innate
analytical principles “Universal Grammar” and the
first-order capability developed out of the interaction of
Universal Grammar and the confrontation with primary
sensory experience ”a grammar” of a specific language.
Cartesian Linguistics accounts for the uniform and
exclusive endowment of man with specific analytical
procedures for linguistic structures by postulating an
innate Universal Grammar and accounts for the creative use
of a specific language by men by postulating the knowledge
of a grammar of this specific language whose form is
constrained by the principles of Universal Grammar.
The conjunction of these four claims forms the
theoretical construct “Cartesian Linguistics”. The rest of
this chapter will bo devoted to the question whether the
Prussian philosopher, statesman and linguist Wilhelm v.
Humboldt held any of those views.
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2.2 Cartesian Linguistics and Wilhelm von Humboldt
One of the more well-known discussions in the
history of the philosophy of language has been aroused by
Noam Chomsky's philosophical interpretation of his thoery
of the human language faculty which has come to be known
as “Generative Grammar". The foundations of Generative
Grammar were laid in Chomsky's (1955) The Logical
° classical piece of
linguistic literature since then. The theory then went
through different stages into its current formulation in
Chomsky (1986). In this paper I will presuppose a basic
familiarity with the systems in Chomsky <1957, 1965,
1981)
.
At the beginning of the sixties Chomsky noticed
certain paralellisms between the foundations of modern
linguistic theory as embodied in Generative Grammar and
assumptions made in several philosophical systems dealing
with man and his language. Chomsky referred to the
totality of these shared assumptions as "Cartesian
linguistics", i.e. the idea was not that a homogeneous
community of researchers or even a homogeneous tradition
of researchers existed who would consider themselves
members of a Cartesian school of language study. Rather,
what Chomsky stressed was that many philosophical and
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linguistic osaumptiona can be found time and again in the
study of language since the seventeenth century. This view
comes out quite clearly in the following quotation from
Chomsky (1966, 2):
There is no single individual who can be shown,
on textual grounds to have held all the views
that will be sketched ... Furthermore, the
aptness of the term "Gatesian linguistics" for
these developments in linguistic theory maay
well be questioned, on several grounds. First,
these developments have roots in earlier
linguistic work; second, several of the most
active contributors to them would surely have
regarded themselves as quite antagonistic to
Cartesian doctrine.
Chomsky's goal therefore is not to give an
accurate account of the history of the philosophy of
language since the seventeenth century, rather
, explicitly, the goal is to "concentrate on the
developments of ideas that have reemerged, quite
independently, in current work" (Chomsky (1966, 2)), i.e.
the modern version of Cartesian linguistics: Generative
Grammar
.
One philosopher whose ideas Chomsky takes to bo
sufficiently similar to the body of ideas ho refers to as
Cartesian linguistics is Wilhelm von Humboldt, who is
often regarded as the founder of linguistics. Chomsky
noted similarities between his own philosophical and
linguistic assumptions and the ideas expressed by von
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Humboldt in his work. Ths similarities and differences
between these two distinguished linguists and
philosophical thinkers about language shall be the topic
of this section.
Some time after Chomsky's interpretation of
Cartesian linguistics had appeared » several critics
appeared on the scene » claiming that Chomsky had
misinterpreted von Humboldt's writings and that what
Chomsky took to be similarities in spirit between von
Humboldt's concepts and his own concepts were similarities
in terminology rather than in content. To give a few
examples* Baumann (1971* 2) comes to the following
conclusion
:
Es ist meine Absicht zu zeigen* dass Chomsky . .
.
die Auffassungen Humboldt's nicht angemessen
wiedergibt und dass Humboldt's 'Theorie' eine
andere ist als die 3 enige* auf die sich die
generative Grammatik zu beziehen glaubt* wenn
sie sich auf Humboldt bezieht.
Or Coseriu (quoted by Baumann from a paper which was not
accessible to the author) believes!
Somit ist der Humboldt* von dem heute in dor
transformationalistischen Litoratur so oft die
Rede ist, nicht der historischo Wilhelm von
Humboldt* sondorn hoochstons ein hybridor "Noam
von Humboldt"
.
Weydt (1976* 57) another one of Chomsky's critics notes
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the following about Chomaky's and von Humboldt's uae of
the concept of "infinite use of finite means"!
Nur das ist festzustellen, dass hier keine
Uebereinstimmung zwischen beiden Autoren
herrscht
.
Other such evaluations of the similarities between
Chomsky's and von Humboldt's systems of thought will be
given and discussed shortly, but at this point I will
introduce the two aspects of the debate that I will
concentrate on! "infinite use of finite means" and v.
Humboldt's term "erzeugen" vs. Chomsky's term "to
generate". I will present Weydt's argument that leads him
to the conclusion just quoted and also the arguments given
by several authors that v. Humboldt's "erzeugen" does not
have anything to do with Chomsky's "to generate".
The goals of this chapter are twofold: first I
want to make a purely methodological point, namely that
Chomsky's position cannot be refuted the way the authors
cited try to. I will try to show that all the authors
attacking Chomsky for misinterpreting v. Humboldt have
committed a methodological fallacy which makes Chomsky's
position immune to their criticism. Second, I want to show
that because the arguments given by Weydt, Baumann and
others against Chomsky's position beg the question,
Chomsky's position is the correct one, i.e. I will defend
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this position on the basis of textual evidence. If the
textual evidence that I give is correct, then Chomsky is
open only to one kind of criticism, namely that he did not
make use of the clearest quotations that can be found for
his position in v. Humboldt's writings, certainly a minor
point.
To give a similar example from semantics: one
cannot refute the claim that the English word “bank" has
the sense “an establishment for the custody, loan,
exchange, or issue of money, for the extension of credit,
and for facilitating the transmission of funds" by
providing evidence of whichever kind that the word is used
with the sense "the rising ground bordering a lake, river,
or sea or forming the edge of a cut or hollow" (Webster)
by native speakers of English. To disprove the claim that
the word can be used with the first sense, one would have
to show that native speakers do in fact not use the
word in this sense; proving other irrelevant properties of
the usage of the word is beside the point.
The overall goal of this paper, as mentioned above,
is thus to give arguments and textual evidence for "the
ambiguity hypothesis**, which attributes to v. Humboldt an
ambiguous and sometimes vague usage of terms. We are by no
means alone in this interpretation of v. Humboldt's
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writings. Amirova et al. (1980) note explicitly:
Dagegen stellen die ob 3ektiv nicht ganz klare
Problemstellung und die nicht eindeutige und oft
schwer interpretierbare Verwendung von
Grundbegriffen, wie "Geist**, •’Denken”,
"Verstand”, "intellektuelle Taetigkeif die
schwache Seite seiner Sprachphilosophie dar.
Humboldt hat dies offenbar eingesehen. Durch
zahlreiche Varianten seiner Formulierungen
versucht er gewissermassen den Einwaenden
zuvorzukommen und gleichzeitig zu zeigen, wie
kompliziert die Erscheinungen der Sprache und
des Denkens und deren Wechselwirkung sind und
wie unsere Kenntnisse historisch begrenzt sind.
It will be enough to give two clear examples of ambiguous
notions in v. Humboldt's works on the philosophy of
language. One striking example is the usage of the word
"language” itself. Note the following passage:
Es ist kein leeres Wortspiel, wenn man die
Sprache als in Selbsttaetigkeit nur aus sich
entspringen und goettlich frei. die Sprachen
aber als gebunden und von den Nationen, welchen
sie angehoeren, abhaengig darstellt. <v.
Humboldt <1973, 37))
"Sprache” thus denotes a social phenomenon belonging to
nations of interacting and communicating people as well as
the private experience of each individual speaker which
makes him part of humanity. It becomes quite clear that v.
Humboldt attributes different properties to these
respective denotations of the word "language”. The social
phenomenon language is dependent on a nation and a
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culture, and as such is as "mannigfaltig" (diverse) as
human culture. This is not true for language as a common
human experience, which is uniform. This interpretation of
ours is shared by Howard Isharm in his Encyclopedia of
Philosophy article on v. Humboldt:
The formation of languages depends on the
spiritual forces of humanity, and languages are
thus not merely an intermediary between
individuals but "the most radiant sign and
certain proof that man does not possess
intrinsically separate individuality." Languages
delineate the cultural characteristics of
nations, each of which has its own individuality
and arouses a sense of unity in men.
The following passages from v. Humboldt also shows that he
links the variability of languages to the variability of
cultures
:
dass der Bau der Sprachen im Menschengeschlecht
darum und insofern verschieden 1st, well und als
es die Geisteseigentuemlichkeit der Nationen
selbst ist.
Das vergleichende Sprachstudium, die genaue
Ergruendung der Mannigfaltigkeit , in welcher
zahllose Voelker dieselbe in sie, als Menschen
gelegte Aufgabe der Sprachbildung loesen,
verliert alles hoehere Interesse, wenn sie sich
nicht an den Punkt anschliesst, in welchem die
Sprache mit der Gestaltung der nationalen
Geisteskraft zusammenhaengt
.
Weit mehr aber, als bei den einzelnen Woertern
zeichnet sich die intellektuelle Verschiedenheit
der Nationen in den Fuegungen der Rede, in dem
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Uinfan^e* wslchon sxe dsn SoGt.zen zu 9eben
vemag, und in der innerhalb dieser Grenzen zu
erreichenden Mannigfaltigkeit
. Hierin liegt das
wahre Bild des Ganges und der Verkettung der
Gedanken* an die sich die Rede nicht wahrhaft
anzuschliessen vermag, wenn nicht die Sprache
den gehoerigen Reichtum und die begeisternde
Freiheit der Fuegungen besitzt. (v. Humboldt
(1973, 163))
We get a completely different picture though, when we try
to find the passages where v. Humboldt characterizes "the
other language", i.e. the human faculty and experience
which is independent of nations and cultures. Here we
typically find passages where the philosopher attributes
uniformity to language:
Da die Naturanlage zur Sprache eine allgemeine
des Henschen ist und alle den Schluessel zum
Verstaendnis aller Sprachen in sich tragen
muessen, so folgt von selbst, dass die Form
aller Sprachen sich im wesentlichen gleich sein
und immer den allgemeinen Zweck erreichen muss.
(V. Humboldt (1973, 200))
Oaechte man sich das vergleichende Sprachstudium
in einiger Vollendung, so muesste die
verschiedene Art, wie die Grammatik und ihre
Formen in den Sprachen genommen werden (denn
dies ist es, was ich unter Auffassung dem
Begriff nach verstehe) , an den einzelnen
grammatischen Formen, wie hier am Dualis, dann
an den einzelnen Sprachen, in jeder im
Zusammenhange erforscht, und endluch diese
doppelte Arbeit dazu benutzt werden, einen
Abriss der menschlichen Sprache, als ein
Allgemeines gedacht, in ihrem Umfange, der
Notwendigkeit ihrer Gesetze und Annahmen, und
der Moeglichkeiten ihrer Zulassungen zu
entwerfen. (v. Humboldt (1973, 21))
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Indem die Sprachen nun also in dem von allem
Nissverstaendnis befreiten Sinno des Worts
Schoepfungen der Nationen sind, bleiben sie doch
Selbstschoepfungen der Individuen, indem sie
sich nur in jedem einzelnen, in ihm aber nur so
erzeigen koennen, dass jeder dsa Verstaendnis
aller voraussetzt und alls dieser Erwartung
genuegen. <v. Humboldt (1973, 37))
Die Formen mehrerer Sprachen koennen in einer
noch allgemeineren Form zusammenkommen, und die
Formen aller tun dies in der Tat, insofern man
ueberall bloss von dem Allgemeinsten ausgeht:
von den Verhaeltnissen und Beziehungen der zur
Bezeichnung der Begriffe und zur Redefuegung
notwendigen Vorstellungen, von der Gleichheit
der Lautorgane, deren Umfang und Natur nur eine
bestimmte Anzahl artikulierter Laute zulaesst.
(V. Humboldt <1973, 43))
Denn so wundervoll 1st in der Sprache die
Individualisierung innerhalb der allgemeinen
Uebereinstimmung, dass man ebenso richtig sagen
kann, dass das ganze Henschengeschlecht nur
eine Sprache, als dass jeder Hensch eine
besondere besitzt. (v. Humboldt (1973, 43))
. . . erklaert sich jene Erscheinung hinlaenglich
daraus, dass der Hensch ueberall eins mit dem
Henschen 1st, und die Entwicklung des
Sprachvermoegens daher mit Huelfe jedes
gegebenen Individuums vor sich gehen kann. Sie
geschieht darum nicht minder aus dem eignen
Inneren; nur weil sie immer zugleich der
aeusseren Anregung bedarf, muss sie sich
der^enigen analog erweisen, die sie gerade
erfaehrt, und kann es bei der Uebereinstimmung
aller menschlichen Sprachen. (v. Humboldt (1973,
52) )
Denn ^ede Sprache bleibt immer ein Abbild jener
urspruenglichen Anlage zur Sprache ueberhaupt
... (v. Humboldt (1973, 206))
Whatever may bo the reason for v. Humboldt's
decision to refer to these different concepts of
"language” by the same notion, it is quite clear that
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"language** in his system stands for two radically different
concepts. The reason certainly is not a lack of words or
attempt to reduce the number of technical terms
introduced, for we find a profileration of different terms
throughout his writings: "sprachliche Kraft”, "das
Sprechen”, "sprachl ichor Organismus", "Sprachvermoegen"
,
"Form der Sprache", "sprachliche Gewalt”, "Sprachbesitz"
,
"Sprachgeist" and many others. It is not clear whether the
ambiguity of "Sprache” extends to all the complex
expressions it goes into; we leave an examination of this
question to further research.
The textual evidence for the ambiguity of the
notion "Sprache" with its different senses is extensive.
We can thus try to determine whether v. Humboldt and
Chomsky's usages of "Sprache" or "language** have something
in common. Although Chomsky shares with v. Humboldt his
interest in political reform and personal engagement in
the proliferation of new and liberal ideas in their
respective societies, his scientific work does not show
any signs of occupation with "language** as a social
phenomenon. Although he, like all generative grammarians,
would stress the necessity of a theory of language use, he
himself has not developed such a theory or advocated one
such theory rather than others. Textual evidence for this
latter claim is easy to find. Chomsky (1981b) starts out
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as follows:
The study of language is guided by a number of
fundamental questions, among them the following:
^^^a» What constitutes knowledge of a language?
b: How does such knowledge develop?
c: How is such knowledge put to use?
The other concept of "language" - the concept of
an experience shared by all humans and only by humans ~ is
found through all of Chomsky's scientific work, in fact
one might say that Chomsky's empirical and philosophical
work on language has been about this concept of language.
This comes out again quite clearly in the last quotation
given, where the first two points raise the question of
the interrelation of each individual human being and the
knowledge of language he personally has and how he has
come to have this knowledge. We can thus only compare
Chomsky's and v. Humboldt's claims about human language,
when we take into account that v. Humboldt describes two
different phenomena with incompatible properties. For the
determination of similarities and dissimilarities of his
views with Chomsky wo may therefore only take into account
the non-social aspect of language, which - for
terminological clarity - I will refer to as I-language
from now on (short for "individual language )
.
Once one has separated the two notions of language
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in V. Hu»boldt'« writings, ths Cartesian aspect of his
philosophy of I -language comes out very strongly, as is
witnessed by the series of quotations about I-language we
gave above. Chomsky defines the Cartesian view on
I-language as follows (Chomsky (1966,59));
The central doctrine of Cartesian linguistics is
that the general features of grammatical
structure are common to all languages and
reflect certain fundamental properties of the
mind.
Compare this to the following passage from v. Humboldt
which we have already seen but which is repeated here for
convenience:
Da die Naturanlage zur Sprache eine allgemeine
des Nenschen ist und alle den Schluessel zum
Verstaendnis aller Sprachen in sich tragen
muessen, so folgt von selbst, doss die Form
aller Sprachen sich im wesentlichen gleich sein
und immer den allgemeinen Zweck erreichen muss.
Although it is true that elsewhere v. Humboldt
claims that humans are predisposed for the language of
their own people, the quotation we just gave shows that
that did not keep him from supporting the general
Cartesian view (in Chomsky's sense) that language is
universal, i.e. that all humans are predisposed for all
human languages, even if one language might be favored.
Note that Chomsky in the passage given does not claim that
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all natural languages have certain itructures in
common, again Chomsky is more careful. He makes the weoker
claim, that general features of grammatical Structure
are common to all languages. But exactly this claim about
I-language we also find in v. Humboldt, for "Form** in the
following paragraph certainly refers to grammatical
features rather than to "Form der Sprache" or "innera
Form":
Daechte man aich das vergleichende Sprachstudium
in einiger Vollendung, so muesste die
verschiedene Art, wie die Grammatik und ihre
Formen in den Sprachen genommen warden (denn
dies ist es, was ich unter Auffassung dam
Begriff nach verstehe) , an den einzelnen
grammatischen Formen, wie hier am Dual is, dann
an den einzelnen Sprachen, in jeder im
Zusammenhange erforscht, und endlich diesa
doppelte Arbeit dazu benutzt werden, einen
Abriss der eenschlichen SprachOj^ als ein
Allgemeines gedacht^ in ihrem Umfange^ der
H2bwendigkeit ihrer Gesetze und Annahmen^ und
entwerfen. (v. Humboldt (1973, 21) emphasis
added)
This result will pave the way for our discussion of other
elements of Chomsky's interpretation of v. Humboldt's
philosophy of language, for example the aspect of his
interpretation criticized by Leppin (1977). Leppin deals
with V. Humboldt's term "erzeugen" and Chomsky's use of
the notion "to generate". The article reaches the
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following concluaion:
Howevar, in *y opinion this translation, though
tschnically correct, is based upon two different
definitions of the term. It follows from
Chomsky's own definitions of 'generative
grammar' that he means 'generate' or 'erzeugen'
in the mathematical sense. For von Humboldt, on
the other hand, the term 'erzeugen' has only
slight connection with what remains stable in a
language, its structure, its form (which he had
recognized as the channels in which the spritual
energy of the members of a nation moves when
creating language)
,
but much more with this
spiritual energy itself.
The methodological fallacy committed by Leppin is
that she does not take into the account the possibility
that V. Humboldt's notion "erzeugen” might be ambiguous
between the two interpretations. This is what Chomsky
obviously claims, for otherwise the following quote would
be puzzling:
Furthermore, "generate" seems to bo the most
appropriate translation for Humboldt's term
"erzeugen”, which he freguently uses, it
seems, in essentially the sense here intended.
(Chomsky (1965,9), emphasis added)
As is quite clear from Chomsky's careful formulation, ho
is not trying to imply that Humboldt's term "erzeugen is
coextensive with the technical usage of "to generate" in
the algebraic sense of combinatorial systems. But this is
what all of Chomsky's critics falsely assume. Thus by
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showing that v. Humboldt's terms, especially the term
erzeugen" have a sense which is incompatible with the
sense of "to generate" in the algebraic sense, and by
providing textual evidence that v. Humboldt did use the
motion in this incompatible sense, Chomsky's position is
unaffected. Baumann (1971) - who admits that "Humboldt ist
in diesem Punkt alles andere als klar" - believes that
Bei Humboldt besteht das "Wesen der Sprache" in
ihrer Geschichtlichkeit, "Erzeugung" hat bei ihm
kein mathematisches, dafuer ein starkes
diachronisches Implikat - das bei Chomsky gerade
fehlt
.
Now, Baumann like Leppin doesn't get beyond this
claim, especially no textual evidence is given that
"Erzeugung", "erzeugen" and similar terms can only be
interpreted diachronically . To show this for some
occurrences of the notions is not enough, since Chomsky
had not questioned that the notion is used in this sense.
To refute Chomsky's interpretation more would have been
necessary, namely the listing of all the passages where v.
Humboldt uses the term "erzeugen" with evidence that only
one interpretation of this notion is possible, but not the
one that Chomsky is advocating for some of the
occurrences. Although none of the authors have achieved
such a goal and no further action on Chomsky's side would
be called for until some such thing has been shown, I want
93
to quote certain passages from v. Humboldt's writings
which seem to favor only the Chomskyian interpretation of
the notions "erzeugen”
, ”Er2eugung” and their synonyms or
are at least compatible with such an interpretation. Note
for example the following passage from v. Humboldt (1973):
Wie ich es hier in diesem einzelnen Falle getan
habe, kann man diesen Akt ueberhaupt den Akt des
selbsttaetigen Setzens durch Zusammenfassung
(Synthesis) nennen. Er kehrt ueberall in die
Sprache zurueck. Am deutlichsten und
offenbarsten erkennt man ihn in der Satzbildung,
dann in den durch Flexion Oder Affixe
abgeleiteten Woertern, endlich ueberhaupt in
alien Verknuepfungen des Begriffs mit dem Laute.
In jedem dieser Faelle wird durch Verbindung
etwas Neues 3§§chaffen. (v. Humboldt (1973,
168) emphasis added)
This passage clearly talks about the formation of forms:
sentences and words. It stresses the creative aspect of
language, in that the produced new sentences and words -
the "Verbindung” represents something new. This fits well
with the following remark where the production of forms by
the speaker in a conversation is high-lighted:
So lange die Bezeichnungen der grammatischen
Verhaeltnisse, als aus einzelnen, mehr oder
weniger trennbaren Elementen bestehend angesehon
werden, kann man sagen, dass der Redende mehr
die Formen in jedem Augenblick selbst
bildet, als sich der vorhandnen bedient. (v.
Humboldt (1985, 62) emphasis added)
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This latter paragraph fits nicely into the Cartesian view
of the human mind and its creativity together with the
following statements:
Obgleich der Erkenntnisgrund dor Wahrheit, des
unbedingt Festen, fuer den Menschen nur in
seinem Inneren liegen kann ... (v. Humboldt
<1973, 49))
Auf diese Weise liegt die Sprache in jedem
Menschen in ihrem ganzen Umfange, was aber
nichts anderes bedeutet, als dass jeder ein,
durch eine bestimmte modifl^ierte Kraft,
anstossend und beschraenkend, geregeltes Streben
besitzt, die ganze Sprache, wie es aeussere Oder
innere Veranlassung herbeifuehrt
,
nach und nach
aus sich hervorzubringen und hervorgebracht zu
verstehen. (v. Humboldt (1973, 49))
A very clear example of v. Humboldt's view that the mind
does not only generate thoughts and facts, but also has
rules to create forms of the language can be given with
the following textual evidence. What is interesting about
this quotation is that v, Humboldt even mentions both the
generation of words and the generation of concepts:
Denn es ist durch sie Cdie Artikulation; G.W.3,
auch in einzelnen Woertern, die Moeglichkeit
gegeben, aus den Elementen dieser eine wirklich
bis ins Unbestimmte gehende Anzahl anderer
Woerter nach bestimmten Gefuehlen und Regeln zu
bilden und dadurch unter alien Woertern eine
Verwandtschaft, entsprechend der Verwandtschaf
t
der Begriffe, zu stiften. (v. Humboldt <1973,
50) )
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Thus V. Humboldt, seems to have envisaged a parallelism in
the generation of concepts and of words. That he only
talks about words and not also about sentences should not
disturb us very much, since he apologizes elsewhere "ihr
Cder Sprache; G.W.] Element, das Wort, bei dem wir der
Vereinfachung wegen stehenbleiben koennen (v. Humboldt
(1973, 138)). Such a parallelism in the generation of
concepts and words in v. Humboldt's philosophy of language
can of course not come as a surprise, given that he held a
particularly strong form of the thesis that language and
thinking are interconnected. In fact he says that
Sie [die intellektuelle Taetigkeit; G.W.] und
die Sprache ist daher eins und unzertrennlich
voneinander
.
and
Die grammatische Formung entspringt aus den
Gesetzen des Denkens durch Sprache . .
.
As a particularly beautiful example of this paralellism of
the forming of forms and the forming of concepts, note
that the thought is supposed to be composed of words. This
statement is made in the same paragraph which starts out
with a discussion of the formation of sentences, v.
Humboldt is thus not making a sharp distinction between
sentences and thoughts, and this is in fact consequent,
since he does not make a difference between language and
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t.hinkin9 processes. If language and thinking are
identified* then it would be surprising if their
respective primitive building blocks were not identical
too
:
Es ist aber zugleich merkwuerdig zu sehen* auf
welchem verschiedenem Wege die geistige Ansicht
hier zur Satzbildung gelangt. Sie geht nicht von
seiner Idee aus, setzt ihn nicht muehevoll
zusammen* sondern gelangt zu ihm, ohne es noch
zu ahnen* indem sie nur dem scharf und
vollstaendig aufgenommenen Eindruck des
Gegenstandes Gestaltung im Laute erteilt. Indem
dies jedesmal richtig und nach demselben
Gefuehle geschieht* ordnet sich der Gedanke aus
den so gebildeten Woertern zusammen. In ihrem
wahren* inneren Wesen ist die hier erwaehnte
geistige Verrichtung ein unmittelbarer Ausfluss
der Staerke und Reinheit des urspruenglichen im
Henschen liegenden Sprachvermoegens. <v.
Humboldt (1973, 125))
We can thus sum up our discussion of Leppin's and
Baumann's criticism of Chomsky's interpretation of v.
Humboldt's usage of the terms “erzeugen” and "Erzeugung"
as follows: both authors have failed to notice that v.
Humboldt uses the notions under discussion in different
senses. Although it is true that many, maybe most of, the
occurrences of the terms suggest a reading in terms of a
diachronic renewal of language, this does not affect
Chomsky's interpretation, since he had not disclaimed
that. The notions can be found in passages where a
diachronic reading does not seem to bo intended or is at
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least implausible, for example the passage referring to
the speaker producing forms in every instant. Here the
interpretation of rule-governed production of linguistic
forms by a speaker of a language is very natural and fits
into V. Humboldt's general conviction that language and
thought processes are identical, with the consequent
identification of their primitives. Since in many of the
paragraphs the creativity of the formation of thoughts and
linguistic forms is stressed along with the individual
mind as the carrier of such thoughts and producer of
language, this aspect of v. Humboldt's philosophy of
language truly deserves to be called Cartesian.
Let us now turn to another one of v. Humboldt's
concepts which is discussed by Chomsky. What is at issue
is closely related to creativity, namely v. Humboldt's use
of the phrase "to make infinite use of finite means'*. We
dxscuss this problem in some detail. In modern
comparative linguistics dealing with the foundations of
the human language faculty, the phrase cited has a clear
application: it refers to the ability of each speaker of a
native language to produce linguistic structures, words,
phrases or sentences, which he has never heard before,
i.e. has not just taken from a store of linguistic
material in his memory. The claim is that a native human
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speaker, subject to memory limitations, processing
limitations and other “on-line restrictions'* can still
produce and understand an amount of linguistic structures
which by far exceeds his memory capacities. Furthermore,
modern linguistic research of course studies an idealized
native speaker who is not subject to any of the
restrictions ^ust mentioned and who lives in an idealized
homogeneous speech community - this idealization is
necessary in order to separate the inherent properties of
the language organ from properties of “on-line organs"
like the memory etc. Since this idealized native speaker
knows all rules of his language perfectly and is not
subject to any errors etc. s/he can produce infinitely
many grammatical structures, since s/he can process
sentences of indefintie length etc. Still the rule system
generating this infinite amount of structures has to be
finite, since the language organ of the idealized speaker
is taken to be finite, since it is not supposed to differ
from the language organ of a normal native speaker.
Chomsky now claims that v. Humboldt has a parallel
idea in mind when he stresses the fact that language von
endlichen Mittel einen unendlichen Gebrauch macht". Weydt
(1976, 57) does not agree with Chomsky on this point:
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Humboldt hat zwar etwas "unendlich** genannt,
aber eindoutig nicht die Zahl der Saetze in dar
Sprache, sondern die Henge dea Denkbaren. Das
heisst: der Gegenstand, ueber den man mit
Sprache sprechon kann, ist unendlich. Fuer
Humboldt besteht der unendliche Oebrauch der
Sprache darin, dass es unendlich viele Gedanken
Oder denkbare Sachverhalte gibt, die man alle
mit Sprache ausdruecken kann. Ueber die Zahl der
Saetze hat er sich nicht geaeussert.
Before we examine the question whether this last
claim is correct » let us first trace Weydt^s argument a
little bit further. Being a biographer of Chomsky's, Weydt
notes that Chomsky had mentioned the fact that languages
make infinite use of finite means already in his earliest
works. Searching the bibliographies and footnotes of these
works, Weydt discovers that v. Humboldt is not mentioned
in any of these early works. He thus concludes that
Chomsky's and v. Humboldt's discovery of this fact must be
independent from one another. However, the relevance of
this detective work is slightly diminished by the fact
that Chomsky had noted the independence of his discoveries
from V. Humboldt's years before Weydt's publication in
Cartesian Linguistics (page 2) . Having established that
Chomsky could not have gotten this insight from v.
Humboldt, maybe he got it from somebody else, having
forgotten where he had taken it from when he was writing
his early books. One candidate whose name can be found in
the footnotes of Syntactic Structures is Louis
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Hjelmslev. H^elmslev in his Prolegomena to a theory of
language had in fact spoken of infinitely many texts of
each language. Since Chomsky marks similarities between
his assumptions and some of Hjelmslev's assumptions in
Chomsky (1357,50)
, maybe this is the real source of
Chomsky's knowledge. Weydt now goes on to show that the
number of sentences of natural languages is in fact not
infinite, i.e. that Chomsky's claim is in fact false. From
this together with the preceding discussion he arrives at
the overall conclusion:
Chomsky's Definition der Sprache ist: System zur
Erzeugung unendlich vieler Saetze. Das ist im
streng theoretischen Sinne nicht akzeptabel.
Annehmbar ist dagegen eine Definition im Sinne
H^elmslevs von der Sprache als System zur
Generierung unendlich vieler Texte. Diese
Definition koennte auch von den Autoren der
ersten Gruppe CBuehler, v. Humboldt, Martinet;
G.W.] akzeptiert werden, sogar in ihrem Sine
sein: fuer unendlich viele, neue, vorher nicht
kommunizierte Nachrichten schafft sich der
Hensch die entsprechenden Texte. Dass man dazu
unendlich lange, Oder aber auch nur ueberlange
Monstersaetze braucht, waere ihnen nicht
eingefalien
.
In this paragraph almost everything that could be false is
in fact false. In the very first sentence Weydt gets his
technical terms mixed up. Chomsky of course does not
define language as a system that produces sentences in the
works that Weydt quotes. A language can in fact not
produce anything, at least if understood in the sense of
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discussed above. Under bhis construal a
language is just a set-theoretic object, namely the set of
grammatical forms generated by some grammar. The same is
course true for Hjelmslev. It is meaningless to say
that a language is a system for the generation of
infinitely many texts. For Hjelmslev, language was a
system of infinitely many texts, not a system for the
generation of texts.
The next claim of Weydt's is not beyond doubt
either, namely that Chomsky was the only one among the
mentioned researchers who claimed that languages contained
infinitely many sentences. According to Weydt Chomsky
contrasts with all the others and since the claim that
human languages contain infinitely many sentences is false
(according to Weydt) Chomsky is the bad guy as compared to
the others. Note that Hjelmslev has an articulate
discussion of infinity in his book. He says the following
(p. 47):
Es werden also im Lauf einer fortgesetzten und
durchgefuehrten Analyse zwei Grenzen
ueberschritten, die unsere Aufmerksamkeit
verdienen: wir ueberschreiten eine Grenze, wo
wir von unbegrenzten Inventaren uebergehen zu
begrenzten, und eine zweite Grenze, wo wir von
Zeichen uebergehen zu Zeichenteilen , die selbst
nicht Zeichen sind.
Hjelmslev thus divides all linguistic forms into two
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classes: one class which contains elements which are
l^'flnite in number and another one which contains
categories finite in number. He also tells us which
categories go into which class:
Wenn der Text unbegrenzt ist, d.h. durch
staendiges Hinzufuegen weiterer Teile
verlaengert werden kann* wie es fuer eine
lebende Sprache, als Text aufgefasst, der Fall
sein wird, dann wird man eine unbegrenzte Anzahl
von Perioden, eine unbegrenzte Anzahl von
Saetzen und eine unbegrenzte Anzahl von Woertern
registrieren koennen. (Hjelmslev (1974, 46))
Note, first that H^elmslev refers to language here as a
text, not as a system for the production of texts, as
Weydt wrongly attributes to him. But what is important for
us is that H 3elmslev indeed claims that the whole language
interpreted as one long text consists of among others
infinitely many sentences. And he must mean: infinitely
many distinct sentences, i.e. we do not count repetitions,
for if we would count repetitions of the same elements,
then his dichotomy of categories with infinite and finite
members doesn't make sense, for then languages will also
contain infinitely many syllables, a claim he explicitly
denies on the same page we found the last quotation on.
Weydt is thus wrong again: Hjelmslev joins the group of
linguists claiming that natural languages contain
infinitely many sentences. And we do not have to engage in
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a costly search to find that the claim about the other
linguistics mentioned is also just false. Weydt quotes from
a paper by Martinet that something (Weydt doesn't give the
full sentence) has infinitely many messages. From this he
concludes that Martinet would never have thought of
claiming that languages contain infinitely many
§®Qtences. Wrong again: in his famous book Elements
General Linguistics we find the following statement
on page 26 :
The number of possible sentences in each
language is theoretically infinite, for there is
no limit to the number of successive monemes
which a given sentence may comprise.
So, Weydt goes into exactly the same trap as Leppin and
Baumann: from the fact that an author makes a statement
which is incompatible with a certain interpretation it
does not follow that the same author does not make a
different statement elsewhere which is compatible with
this interpretation. Weydt 's case is of course more
extreme than the other two, since his whole project is to
accuse Chomsky of having taken an idea from somebody else
and in addition having taken it incorrectly. I guess it is
fair to say that we either fundamentally misunderstand
Weydt' s statements or we are forced to arrive at the
conclusion that the reader of Weydt 's work better check
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his claims very carefully.
Let us just take a look at the work of the last
linguist mentioned in Weydt's list of people who deny that
human languages contain infinitely many sentences. This is
Buehler. We give Weydt's quotation first. It turns out
that Weydt here follows a habit which Chomsky unfortunately
shares with him sometimes, namely he quotes quite
selectively. If one looks at the full quote, which follows
after the extract, then the picture looks slightly
different
:
. . . wir alle koennen . . . ins Unuebersehbare
Neues und immer Neues intersubjektiv
verstaendlich sprachlich zur Darstellung bringen
Denn wir alle koennen nicht darum praktisch ins
Unabsehbare Neues und immer Neues intersubjektiv
verstaendlich sprachlich zur Darstellung
bringen, weil wir und die anderen Akrobaten der
Nnemotechnik waeren, sondern weil dies bei einem
Feldsystem vom Typus der Sprache gar nicht
verlangt wird. Wir koennen auch Zahlen ins
Unbegrenzte mit nur zehn Elementarzeichen und
einer sehr einfachen konventionell festgelegten
"Syntax** symbol isieren. Die Konvention des
dekadischen Ziffernsystems lautet: die Ziffern
enthalten von rechts nach links den Wert von
Einern, Zehnern, Hundertern . . . Was wir hier das
Mitverwerten, Mitausnutzen der Reihenfolge
leisten sehen, dasselbe und noch weit Subtileres
liegt nach Anlage und Leistung in der Syntax der
Sprache beschlossen. (Buehler 1934,77
Although it is true that Buehler does not talk about
sentences of natural language and we doinfinitely many
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not know whether he does elsewhere in his book, since we
just checked this one quotation, it remains true that in
the sentences following his admiration of the linguistic
creativity of native speakers ho gives an example of how a
syntactic algorithm is able to generate a sot with
infinitely many members, namely the sot of all integers.
Wo can now come back to our main concern:
Chomsky's claim that many features of Wilhelm von
Humboldt's philosophy of language are Cartesian. One
Cartesian property is creativity, or more specific, the
ability of the language competence of the native speaker
to make infinite use of finite means. It remains to be
established whether v. Humboldt's use of this phrase has a
meaning that makes it an instance or at least a version of
the Cartesian concept, as defined above. We remember that
Chomsky had claimed that v. Humboldt had "the idea that a
language is based on a system of rules determining the
interpretation of its infinitely many sentences" (Chomsky
1965, V). Lot us therefore proceed systematically in that
we determine first, whether we find passages in v.
Humboldt's work where he talks about rules. Then we search
^he texts for passages which might be related to the
question of creativity.
The next passage shows v. Humboldt's concern about
the generation of sentences, the "Bildung des Satzes”
the "Formation" :
3
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and
Die Physiologie der Sprachen muss, urn bei der
Grammatik stehen zu bleiben, lehren
, wie sie
zum Zweck aller Sprache, zur Bildung des
§2^S@s, und, durch Verknuepfung der Saetze,
der Periode gelangen; damit haengt
groesstentheils die grammatische Behandlung der
Redetheile, die Formation, zusammen, diese
aber weiter mit dem Lautsystem. (IV, lOf;
emphasis added)
In the Ankuendigung einer Schrift ueber die Vaskische
Sprache und Nation we find the following description of
the task of linguistics (the "Zergliederung" of language)
:
So besteht jede Sprache auf der einen Seite aus
einer grossen Menge analogisch gebildeter
Reihen, auf der andren aus Grundstoffen, von
denen sich weiter keine Rechenschaft geben
laesst
.
Diesen zwiefachen Bestandtheil der
Sprache nun muss eine gelungene Zergliederung
derselben vollstaendig und genau nachweisen,
^ede Spur systematischer Regelmaessigkeit
verfolgend, die Sprache nach alien Richtungen
hin untersuchen . . . Ihr letztes Resultat ist
alsdann ein zwiefaches: ein System mehr , oder
weniger allgemeiner und sicherer Regeln,
Grundsaetze und Analogien, der eigentliche
Organismus der Sprache, und eine gleichsam
unorganische Masse von nicht weiter zerlegbaren
Sprachelementen. (Ill, 297f; emphasis added)
And in the "Grundzuege des allgemeinen Sprachtypus we
find the requirement that every grammar should "von dem
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Laut^element, bis Bildung des Sabzes schrit.t>weise
aufsteigen" <V, 371). This is of course exactly the
conception of grammar that Chomsky^ has developed in
Chomsky (1955), where the grammatical description of a
sentence is defined as the set of representations on
linguistic levels (phonemic, syntactic etc.) determined by
the rules of grammar. The similiarity of these two views
is quite striking, especially if one looks at v.
Humboldt's actual practical grammatical research. In the
less metatheoretical and more data-oriented writings of v.
Humboldt one finds a systematic approach which is both
structured and unambiguous in its terminology, so that the
following assessment of Chomsky's work by Gardner in his
recent overview of Cognitive Science might as rightfully
be applied to v. Humboldt as to Chomsky:
Che] approached this task with a seriousness of
purpose, an arsenal of logical and mathematical
tools, a finesse and a finality of argument that
had simply not been marshaled hitherto in
linguistic analysis. (Gardner 1985, 188)
Of course v. Humboldt's writings lack the mathematical
approach to the analysis of language, but the reason for
this is of course that in his days the algebraic means for
a formal treatment of language had not yet been developed.
But even without these means, v. Humboldt's analyses
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achieve a remarkable clarity, range of explanation and
eyetematicity
. We will come back to some of these elements
later
.
Note the following very interesting passage from
his “attempt of an analysis of the mexican language",
which describes the general goal of linguistic theory.
Reading this passage, one might be tempted to turn the
book twice to make sure that one is reading the collected
works of V. Humboldt, rather than some programmatic work
of Generative Grammar:
Allerdings aber fordert dies Studium auf diese
Weise anstellen zu koennen, Vorarbeiten, welche
^etzt nicht vorhanden sind, und ihre methodische
Verknuepfung in sin System, das alsdann als eine
Encyclopaedia der gesammten Sprachkunde gelten
koennte. . . Philosophisch muesste eroertert
warden, worin eigentlich der Organismus der
Sprache besteht, und darauf geschichtlich, wie
vielerlei Arten desselben die Sprachkunde
aufzuzaehlen weiss. In diesem ersten allgemeinen
Theile wuerden nicht, wie im zweiten die
Sprachen durch alle Theile ihres Baues, sondern
diese Theile durch alle Sprachen verfolgt. Man
erhielte daher hier die Aufzaehlung aller
menschlichen Sprachlaute, die Beschreibung und
Geschichte der Declination, des Verbi durch alle
Zeiten und Voelker. . . Auf dies Zusammennehmen
aller Sprachen folgte die Absoderunng der
einzelnen. Hier wuerden sie ihren
Verwandtschaften nach classenweise aufgestellt,
alle ihre Elemente, Formeln, Regain in ihnen
zu einem Ganzen vereinigt, und der individuelle
Charakter, die individuelle Weltvorstellung
daraus hergeleitet. (IV, 252f; emphasis added)
In the same work wo even find the clear statement that a
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^^®***®*^ nothing else than the collection of all the
generalizations of a language that can be expressed by
rules, which is of course only a reformulation of the idea
that a grammar is a set of rules specifying the form and
interpretation of the sentences of a languages
Ich werde nun zeigen, wie aus denselben
CWortelementen; G.W.] die Woerter, deren sich
die Rede bedient, sie moegen einfache, Oder
zusammengesetzte seyn, gebildet und hernach wie
die so gebildeten Woerter zu der
zusammenhaengenden Rede verbunden werden. Das
l§^ztere ist das bestimmte und Qigentliche
der Grammatik, obgleich man auch das
erste, die Bildung von Substantiven aus Verbis,
von Ad^ektiven aus beiden u.s.f. wohl mit in die
Grammatik aufnimmt, und Alles in ihr
zusammenfasstj(, was sich auf Regeln
zurueckbringen laesst. (IV, 261; emphasis
added)
That Wilhelm von Humboldt was a Generative Grammarian,
even in the most modern sense of the word and not just in
the sense that every grammarian ipso facto that he is a
grammarian has to be a generative grammarian comes out in
his emphasis to make infinite use of finite means in the
production of linguistic forms. In the next paragraph he
talks about the production of words by a speaker which is
not explainable by memory capacities. It is claimed that
in actual daily discourse a speaker has the capacity to
generate form because he has internalized the key for the
production of words”. but this key of course is the
generative rule system whose output is an infinitude of
grammatical forms* be they words or sentences!
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Man kann den Wortvorrat elner Sprache auf keine
Weise als eine fertig daliegende Masse ansehen.
Er ist* auch ohne ausschliesslich der
bestaendigen Bildung neuer Woerter und
Wortformen zu gedenken* so lange die Sprache im
Nunde des Volks lebt* ein fortgehendes
iEZsugnis und Wiedererzeugnis des
wortbildenden Vermoegens* zuerst in dem Stamme,
dem die Sprache ihre Form verdankt* dann in der
kindischen Erlernung des Sprechens und endlich
im taeglichen Gebrauche der Rede. Die
unfehlbare Gegenwart des jedesmal notwendigen
Wortes in dieser ist gewiss nicht bloss Werk des
Gedaechtnisses . Kein menschliches Gedaechtnis
E§ichte dazu hin^ ^§00 leele
zugleich den Schluessel zur
Humboldt 1973* 99; emphasis added^)
This kind of paragraph is especially instructive for our
purposes. Of course it is true that v. Humboldt talks
about diachronic facts of language very often* in
particular in his metatheoretical works. But it is a
mistake to assume that he wouldn't have thought about
synchronic aspects of natural language* in fact we know
that it is impossible to make statements about diachrony
before an analysis of the synchronic states of the language
one is comparing or mapping on each other. If one reads v.
Humboldt carefully* then one finds a host of passages like
the one quoted* where he explicitly ensures that his claim
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of a faculty of productive generation of linguistic foras
(the Schluessel zur Bildung der Woerter”) is part of the
everyday compentence of a speaker ("ia taeglichen
G®^^®'iche der Rede**). To overlook such paragraphs just
means to overlook a whole dimension of v. Humboldt's work.
This is the main objective of our ambiguity hypothesis: v.
Humboldt's work has a much greater extension than the
people who reject Chomsky's interpretation are willing to
admit, but that subjects them to the criticism that they
have not grasped the complete dimension of the oeuvre of
the founder of linguistics as a discipline separate from
philosophy and psychology.
It is thus Chomsky's merit to have contributed to a less
biased view of v. Humboldt's work, a view that does not
unilaterally stress his interest in diachronic and mystical
aspects of language while supressing his fundamental
findings on the nature of the human language competence.
Both aspects of his work are valid and should not be
denied .
^
To finish this section on v. Humboldt's conception
of linguistic rules, let me quote a little passage from
his "Berichtigungen und Zusaetze zum ersten Abschnitte des
zweiten Bandes des Mithridates ueber die Cantabrische Oder
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Baskische Sprache", where we find him as an active
linguistic researcher again, which gives us a chance to
witness his style in practice. Summing up some treatments
of Vaskic conjugation in other grammar he complains about
Larramendi s treatment which seems to me to express his
complete contempt for structuralist-type search for
paradigms
:
Man findet bei ihm also nur Paradigmen, von don
Regeln aber, welche don Sprachforscher am
moisten interessieren
, nur einen sehr kleinen
Thoil. (Ill, 258)
We can sum up our findings so far: there is strong textual
evidence for Chomskys claim that v. Humboldt did in deed
believe that a grammar should be a set of rules which
capture the generalization of the form of the language. He
considered paradigms not interesting for a grammar and
believed that the faculty of a speaker to produce a wealth
of linguistic forms in daily speech cannot be explained by
retrieval from memory storage but has to bo accounted for
by the postulation of a grammatical rule system
represented within the speaker. Having established v.
Humboldt's belief in the existence of a grammatical rule
system wo can now proceed one step further to ask whether
he believed in the claim that a speaker equipped with such
a rule system would be able to generate infinitely many
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grammatical forms. Chomsky had only attributed to v.
Humboldt the belief that this grammatical rule system
would generate infinitely many sentences. We will go one
step further in that we will check whether he believed
that the grammar would generate infinitely many forms, be
they sentences or words, for this latter distinction is
quite irrelevant for the purposes of Cartesian
linguistics. The aspect of creativity, the capacity to
make infinite use of finite means, can be demonstrated
with both sentences and words, and if v. Humboldt held one
or the other or both, then this shall be sufficient for us
to call him a Cartesian linguist.
We remember that Weydt had claimed that v.
Humboldt had not talked about sentences when he wrote
about infinity:
Fuer Humboldt besteht der unendliche Gebrauch
der Sprache darin, dass es unendlich viele
Gedanken Oder denkbare Sachverhalte gibt, die
man alle mit der Sprache ausdruecken kann. Ueber
die Zahl der Saetze hat er sich nicht
geaeussert . (Weydt 1976, 57)
We had already noticed that Weydt 's textual claims about
Hjelmslev, Martinet and Buehler failed and we are now
forced to admit that his interpretation of v. Humboldt is
problematic, too. Note the following quotation:
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Zwar laesst, die srammaticalische und
und die ganze Woertermasse
einer Sprache, wenn sie auch gewisse Regeln
und Bildungen feet beetimmt, doch in der
Anwendung eine unendliche Menge von
Hodificationen zu, und gewaehrt dem Geiste iamer
noch eine grosse Freiheit. (IV, 246; emphasis
added)
The subject of this paragraph is clearly the rule-governed
^oJ^*"®tion of grammatical and lexical form* especially
words. We believe that it is plausible that words are
taken only as one paradigmatic example and that v.
Humboldt would extend the validity of this claim to
sentences; we remember his excuse for simplification:
Ihr [die Sprache; G.W.] Element, das Wort, bei
dem wir der Vereinfachung wegen stehenbleiben
koennen ... (1973. 138)
To make sure that we are not misunderstood: I am not
claiming that v. Humboldt claimed only the output of the
grammatical formation process of linguistic form to be
infinite. Of course Weydt is right in assuring that v.
Humboldt also believed the set of thoughts that a person
can think to be infinite. But this is another shortcoming
of Weydt 's v. Humboldt-interpretation : given v. Humboldt's
strong linguistic relativism, i.e. his claims about the
paralellism and interaction, if not identity of thought
and language, it follows that the following argument is
valid
:
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A: There are infinitely many thought-units
B. There is a strong paralellism between thought-units and
linguistic units
C; There are infinitely many linguistic units
We do not have to find textual evidence that v. Humboldt
held proposition A» since this is universally accepted.
If, however, we can find evidence for a belief in B in his
writings, or even a stronger proposition than B, maybe B'
:
"We think in language", than C has to be true, too. We
shall now try to find evidence that v. Humboldt held
propositions like B which make the above argument valid
and support Chomsky's claim that v. Humboldt believed that
a grammar should be a rule system generating infinitely
many linguistic forms. In his announcement of a treatise
on the Vaskic language and nation we find the following
description of the goal of his grammatical works
Ich werde hierbei eine, so viel
moeglich, kurze, aber systematische und
ox*schoepfende Methods zu waehlen suchen, um, so
woit es geschehen kann, koine Seite unboruehrt
2u lassen, wolche zum Vergleichspuncte dienen
kann, und einen vollstaendigen Begriff nicht nur
von dem grammatikalischen, sondern auch
lexikalischen Bau des Vaskischen zu geben; erst
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das Vorhaeltnis aller Theile der Sprache zu
einander, und dann dor ganzon Spracho, als
Darstellungsmittol, zu ihrom Gogonstando,
demjenigen was dargestellt werdon soil
< 2bgleich dioss nie von ihr solbst goschiodon
!S3DD^ » ®usoinandorzusotzon
. (Ill, 294;
emphasis added)
V, Humboldt states often that for him language has the
of functioning as a means for the expression of
thought
.
"Der Hensch denkt nur vermittelst der Sprache
..." (IV, 26)7
Das Denken, welches vermittelst dor Sprache
geschieht, ist entweder auf aeussre,
koerperliche Zwecke, Oder auf sich selbst, also
auf geistigo gorichtet. (v. Humboldt (1985, 67))
For him, language is a "Darstellungsmittol", a means of
representation, for the content of thoughts. But in the
above quotation he claims that one cannot really separate
these two dimensions of human activity: language and
thought are not really two distict dimensions, they are
realizations of one and the same underlying phenomenon, of
the expressive capacity of the human species. The same
point is made in the next quotation:
Man muss sich nur durchaus vo der Idee
losmachen, dass sie Cdie Sprache; G.W.] sich so
von demjenigen, was sie bezeichnet absondern
lasse, wie z.B. der Name eines Menschen von
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seiner Person ... <III, 296)
At another occosion the phenomenon of written languoge is
described. Here we learn that the thought is even formed
by language:
Denn die Schrift, auch da, wo sie sich noch am
wenigsten vom Bilde unterscheidet
, ist doch
immer nur Bezeichnung des schon durch die
Sprache geformten Gedanken. <V, 35)
And if there is a strong paralellism or maybe even an
identity between thoughts and linguistic form, then
thoughts themselves may or must have a form, not only
content
:
dass der Charakter der vollkommner gebildeten
Sprachen dadurch bestimmt wird, dass die Natur
ihres Baues beweist, dass es dem Geist nicht
bloss auf den Inhalt, sondern vorzueglich auf
die Form des Gedanken ankommt. (V, IlOf)
I can understand this previous quotation only as follows:
languages have a certain "Bau" (structure) and the "Geist"
(mind) knows this structure and operates and manipulates
this structure. This structure is in fact not only a
structure of the sentences of the language which are
independent of the content and structure of thoughts, but
rather the structure of the language and the operations of
the mind manipulating this structure operates on thoughts
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to give them form and to manipulate it. There i« no
difference between thoughts and sentences, the grammar
determines the form of both sentences and thoughts. If
this is not the correct interpretation, then I do not
understand the following quotation from v. Humboldt's work
on the grammatical structure of the Chinese language:
Die Grammatik ist mehr, als irgend ein anderer
Theil der Sprache, unsichtbar in der Denkweise
des Sprechenden vorhanden ... (V, 311)
If this is not the correct interpretation, then it also
remains mysterious to me what is meant by the phrase
"grammatische Ideenverknuepfung** (IV, lOf > . It seems to me
that if our interpretation is not the right one then this
phrase should be meaningless. In the next quotations v.
Humboldt even alternates between "sentence" and "thought",
and he can do that, since for him they are
interchangeable
:
Die Wortstellung ist, ohne in einer Sprache mit
andren Huelfsmitteln der grammatischen
Bezeichnung verbunden zu werden, ausser Stande,
anzudeuten, in welcher bestimmten grammatischen
Form jedes Wort eines Satzes genommen werde
muss, ja nur ueberhaupt alle Theile des
Gedanken unverkennbar zu bezeichnen. (IV,
il9)
Von da aus verbreitet sich aber der wohlthaetige
Einfluss eines reichen grammatischen Formenbaues
ueber das ganze Denksystem. Diese so
unbedeutend erscheinenden Formen erlauben, indem
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»io Mittal dorbletan, die ^ae^ze zu
arwaltarn und zu verschlingan
, dam Gaiata ainen
fraiaran Schwung. (IV, 322; emphaaia addad)
Wann aa mir galungan iat, dia Flaxionamathoda in
ihrar ganzan Vollataendigkeit zu achildarn, wia
aia cillain dam Worta vor dam Gaiata und dam Ohre
dia wahra innare Faatigkait vorleiht und
zugleich mit Sicharhait die Teile das
dar notwendigen
69^on{5anvarachl ingung gemaeas,
auaainandarwirft , ao blaibt ea unzweifelhaft
,
daaa aia auaachliaaalich das reine Prinzip dea
Sprachbauaa in aich bewahrt. <v. Humboldt <1973,
130)^)
Wa have argued above in connection with the formal
argument wa draw that if v. Humboldt held propoaitiona A
and B, than he would alao be forced to hold the concluaion
C, namely that there are infinitely many forma of a
language which accompany the thoughta of a peraon.
Everybody aaaumea that v. Humboldt did hold propoaition A,
there waa no controveray over thia point to begin with.
Now we have given atrong textual evidence that v, Humboldt
alao held B, ao that ha ia forced to hold the concluaion
as wall. One might wonder, whether v. Humboldt was really
forced to hold C, or whether he wouldn't have been
quite willing to do ao anyway, given the tight
relationship he postulated between language and thought.
Aren't there any clear quotations, where he links up
language and thought and talks at the same time about
fact there is one, and as we expect, v.infinity? In
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Humboldt ^ust sums up the logic of the argument that we
gave above:
Denn die Neigung, eine Vielfachheit fein und
scharf abgegrenzter Artikulationen zu bilden,
und das Streben des Verstandes, der Sprache so
vile und bestimmt gesonderte Formen zu schaffen,
als sie deren bedarf
, urn den in seiner
unendlichen Mannigfaltigkeit fluechtigen
Gedanken zu fesseln, weaken sich immer
gegenseitig. Urspruenglich, in den unsichtbaren
Bewegungen dee Geistes, darf man sich, was den
Laut angeht, und was der innere Sprachzweck
©rfordert, die bezeichnenden und die das zu
Bezeichnende erzeugenden Kraefte auf keine Weise
geschieden denken. Beide vereint und umfaset das
allgemeine Sprachvermoegen
. <v. Humboldt <1973,
80) )
This clearly shows that Weydt"s interpretation of v.
Humboldt is wrong and that Chomsky^ s interpretation is
correct, v. Humboldt does in fact claim that the human
mind has the desire to express thoughts and that there are
infinitely many possible thoughts. Since man possesses the
“allgemeine Sprachvermoegen” (general linguistic
competence), he is able to generate both the content and
the form of those thoughts and sentences. And by
“erzeugen” v. Humboldt here means among others the process
of form production, i.e. the production of linguistic
forms like sentences and words. Note, in particular, that
it does not make any sense in this quotation to interpret
“to generate” in a diachronic way. Especially Leppin had
argued that Chomsky misinterpreted v. Humboldt's term “to
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generate" which allegedly was only used to mean the
historical self
-recreation of a language and not in its
algebraic sense familiar from modern mathematical
linguistics. But in this quotation the generating forces
are generating something that refers and at the same time
something that is referred to. But if the output of the
generation process, as is certainly the case in other
passages, were a recreated grammatical system, then it
^*^ould be nonsense to say that the rule system refers to
something. Rule systems, as we said, did play an important
role in V. Humboldt's philosophy of language and in his
linguistic work, but v. Humboldt certainly thought of them
as expressing linguistic generalizations and as
representing the "Sprachvermoegen” of a human being. To
attribute to him the nonsensical claim that grammars are
referential, cannot be in the interest of anybody. Leppin,
like all the gratuitous authors mentioned in this thesis,
has thus overlooked many clear passages in v. Humboldt's
writings and has failed to notice the full spectrum of
arguments put forward by v. Humboldt. We will complete the
discussion about what Chomsky called “the creative aspect
of language use" by just collecting several quotations
from different works by v. Humboldt, which also show that
he held the view that a grammar of a language should
generate infinitely many forms. The following quotations
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differ from th® ones above in that they do not depend on
of ® close paralellism between language and
thought. Here wo get clear and I believe unambiguous
statements about linguistic form and what has come to be
called “weak generative capacity" of the grammars of
natural language:
Es vereinigen sich also im Nenschen zwei
Gebiete* welche dor Theilung bis auf eine
uebersehbare Zahl fester Elemtente. der
Verbindung dieser aber bis ins Unendliche
faehig sind, und in welchen jeder Theil seine
eigenthueml iche Natur immer zugleich als
Verhoeltnis zu den zu ihm gehoerenden darstellt.
Der Hensch besitzt die Kraft, diese Gebiete zu
theilen, geistig durch Reflexion, koerperlich
durch Articulation, und ihre Theile wieder zu
verbinden, geistig durch die Synthesis des
Verstandes, koerperlich durch den Accent,
^olcher die Silben zum Wgrte^ und die Worte
zur Rede vereint. (IV, 4; emphasis added)
2onn jade iet unendlicher Ngtur, und
erlaubt doher nicht, doss sie je vollstoendig
ergruendet, und noch viel weniger vollstoendig
dargestellt werde. (v. Humboldt (1973, 12)
>
Hit diesen Elementen aber will die Rede die
zahllosen Kombinationen des gefluegelten
Gedanken, ohne in ihrer Dnendlichkeit
beschroenkt zu worden, erreichen. Dorn Ausdrucke
oiler dieser Vorknuopfungen liogt die
zum Grunde, und es ist jener
freie Aufflug nur mooglich, wenn die Teile des
einfachen Satzes nach aus seinem Wesenn
geschoepfter Notwondigkoit , nicht mit mehr oder
weniger Willkuer anoinandor gelassen oder
getrennt sind. (v. Humboldt (1973, 121);
emphasis added)
We have thus established that v. Humboldt has held
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many of the positions which wo take to define the
construct ’’Cartesian linguistics". In particular he
believed that our knowledge of language is determined by
the internalization of a grammatical rule system which is
able to generate infinitely many forms of the language
which refer to thoughts. The rule system itself is finite
however# so that it was his conviction that every speaker
of a language makes infinite use of finite means. The main
purpose of language is to serve as an expression of
thought and the linguistic competence of the speaker# i.e.
the knowledge of a rule system accounts for the creative
aspect of this use of language.
In the last section of this chapter we will roam a
little in the works of v. Humboldt to determine whether we
might not find evidence for more Cartesian linguistic
positions. Cartesian linguistics is concerned with an
explanation of the human language faculty# i.e. we saw in
3.1 that Cartesian linguistics tries to find an answer to
the question: "How is knowledge of language acquired?” The
best answer that is available to this question today seems
to be the following according to most Cartesian
1 inguistists : natural languages have complex structural
properties which have to be detected by linguists in
difficult empirical investigations. Knowledge of a
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Ian9ua9@ is t>he firs^ order knowled9e of underst.andin9 and
producin9 an infinite amount of 9rammatical forms
belon9in9 to the Ian9ua9e on the basis of an internalized
system of rules and principles. Given the uniformity of
this first order knowled9e across the species and 9iven
furthermore the problem that the actual rule system is
tremendously underdetermined by the primary data available
to the Ian9ua9e learner, Cartesian lin9uists attribute a
second-order capability to human bein9s. This second-order
knowled9e which is referred to as “Universal Grammar” is
the ability to analyze structured primary data of
experience in predetermined ways. The second-order
knowled9e which consists of a set of hi9hly abstract
principles and parameters 9overnin9 the structure and the
use of Ian9ua9e interacts with the information contained
in the primary data to form the first order knowled9e
described above. The fundamental principles 90vernin9
ultimately the lin9uistic competence and behavior of an
or9anism have universal validity because of biolo9ical
necessity (rather than lo9ical necessity), i.e. because
they are part of the initial state of the mental structure
of every member of the human species.
Is there any evidence that v. Humboldt mi9ht have
a9reed with this 9eneral point of view? There is plenty.
In fact, it seems that v. Humboldt makes even more radical
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claims: not only did he hold that the human capacity for
linguistic behavior is innate, but in addition he held the
view that specific knowlege about specific languages is
innate, i.e. German children are born with a certain
knowldege about German etc. This fact is stressed in the
*®in stream interpretation of v. Humboldt's work (cf. for
example again Baumann's paper), but this interpretation is
biased again: it is correct that v. Humboldt believed in
the innateness of certain linguistic specifics of one
language, but he certainly believed that humans are also
born with a knowledge of linguistic aspects independent of
the specific language their people speaks. This comes out
clearly in the following passage, where he carefully
distinguishes these two aspects:
Bei der Beurtheilung der Nationalanlage in der
Spracherfindung ist aber wieder eine besondre,
individuelle von der in der menschlichen Natur
ueberhaupt liegenden zu unterscheiden . Denn die
Sprache im Allgemeinen ist das Erzeugnis eines
menschlich intellectuellen Instincts, und
insofern bedingt durch die allgemeine Anlage der
Organe, und des Denk- und Empfindungsvermoegens
.
Was mit diesen an sich uebereinstimmend ist,
kann daher nicht auf Rechnung besondrer
geistiger Individualitaet geschrieben werden
.
<IV, 18)
This knowledge which is common to all members of the human
species is the "Sprachvermoegen” which we had already come
across on different occasions. And it is exactly this
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human capacity, the "Sprachvermoegen** which lingustics as
a new science independent of philosophy has to study and
explain
:
Qi§§® so weit es geschehen kann^
Sy ^BEyyhfaehigkeit des
H®0§9b®Q9®§9lli®5ht8 auszumessen^ !5y§§ y§§
§iS®Q^^icb® QySSiiSyft 9iQ®B iiQl®itung in das
3®®9*te Sprachstudium sein. <v, Humboldt
(1973, 14); emphasis added)
For V. Humboldt, as for the Cartesian linguist in general,
languages are not studied for their own sake. The study of
language is just a tool for a study of the structure of
the human mind. We try to account for the human linguistic
capacity, i.e. the questions (a) What constitutes
knowledge of a language? (b) How is this knowledge
acquired? and (c) How is this knowledge put to use? - in order
to determine how this linguistic competence interacts with
other cognitive capacities of man. v. Humboldt articulates
exactly this viewpoint and the following passage could
well have been taken from Chomsky's writings, but it is in
fact taken from v. Humboldt and was written more than 170
years ago
:
Ohne daher ueber diesen ganzen Gegenstand eine
neue, eigne, in sich vollstaendig, und im
Zusammenhange mit alien angrenzenden Gebieten
durchgefuehrte Untersuchung aufs neue
anzustellen, wird es nie moeglich sein, das
Sprachstudium auf eine wahrhaft fruchtbringende
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Weiso in dio uebrigon monschlichen Kenntnisse
eingreifen zu laasen <1973, 15f)
The structure of the mind and human creativity are closely
correlated. Since language has the primary function of
expressing thought ("Die zunaechstliegende, aber
beschraenkteste Ansicht dor Sprache ist die, sie als ein
blosses Vorstaendigungsmittel zu betrachten" <v. Humboldt
<1973, 21)) an analysis of the universal aspects of
language allows conclusions about the structure of thought
and human creativity; but this creativity is not
unbounded. The universal aspects of language also
constrain the products of the human mind, otherwise the
mind would entertain all possible hypotheses and would not
be able to attain any knowledge at all:
Jede Sprache setzt dem Geiste der 3 snigen, welche
sie sprechen, gewisse Grenzen, schliesst,
insofern sie eine gewisse Richtung gibt, andre
aus. Die Erforschung aller Sprachen kann daher
darauf fuehren, zu sehen, welches der weiteste
Aufflug ist, den eine gestattet, und auf welche
Weise die Grenzen des menschlichen Geistes von
dieser Seite gleichsam historisch zu bestimmen
Sind. <v. Humboldt <1973, 14))
The next passage makes the same point and again one has
the impression that one is reading a work from the second
half of the twentieth century, rather than one from the
first half of the nineteenth:
128
. . . vermutlich 1st der eigentlicho Grund dor
Vielheit. der Sprachen das innere Beduerfis des
raenschlichen Geistes, eine Mannigfaltigkeit
intellektuellor Formen hervorzubringon, welcheihre Schranke auf uns gieich unbekannte Weise,
als die Mannigfaltigkeit der belebten
Naturbildungen, findet. Will man diese
Asnlichkeit welter verfolgens so laesst sich
^i®H©icht auch behaupten* dass eigentlich neue
Sprachen nicht mehr entstehen; allein Spielarton
viel mehr als in der, ueberhaupt weit fester
begrenzten physischen Natur. <v. Humboldt (1973,
13) )
So we find an interesting dialectic between the infinite
creativity of human thought and language as the carrier of
this thought and the constraints that are put on this
creativity by the structure of the human mind and the
human organs in general
:
Wiewohl alle Sprachen im Ganzen ungefaehr
denselben Bau haben, und gleichen Gesetzen
folgen, so giebt es doch schwerlich eine, die
sich nicht noch durch eine besondre
Eigenthuemlichkeit von den anderen
unterschiede . . . Allein alle einzelne Sprachen
finden sich zusammen, alle noch so
entgegengesetzte Eigenthuemlichkeiten vereinigen
sich in dem Sprachvermoegen des Menschen. Dieses
Vermoegen 1st der Hittelpunkt des
Sprachstudiums . . . Wir haben daher darin ein
Gebiet, das, neben der allgemeinen
Gleichfoermigkeit , innerhalb seiner Graenzen
eine ganz unbestimmbare, und weit
unerschoepfliche Mannigfaltigkeit bewahrt. Doch
auch dies Gebiet 1st scharf begraenzt einmal
durch die Natur der Sprachen, als Werkzeuge, die
aus einer bestimmten Zahl von Lauten bestehen,
und nur eine bestimmten Anzahl von Verbindungen
dieser zulassen; dann durch die Natur des
Menschen, die Beschaffenheit seiner Organe, und
den moeglichen Umfang seiner Faehigkeit
wahrzunehmen , zu denken, und zu empfinden;
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ferner durch die unabaendorlichen Gesetze der
allgemeinen Ideen ... CIV, 243)
Butr bhe Sprachvermoegen*’ is a truly human property, no
other species has this capacity. One of the most important
®^9^™®nts for the Cartesian dualism is represented by the
^lf^®J^®nce between beasts and humans, v. Humboldt repeats
exactly this Cartesian argument:
Auch laesst sich die Articulation der Toene,
yQ9®b®yE® yo^®£®9b^®^ ^wischen der
Stummheit des Thiers^ yod der ntsnschlichen
Rede nicht physisch erklaeren. (IV, 4;
emphasis added)
Like Descartes, v. Humboldt notes that deaf mutes display
linguistic capabilities and construes this as a decisive
argument that it is not just the absence of the proper
organs of speech which makes animals incapable of
speaking. Rather it is the **Sprachvermoegen*’ which they
lack and which is part of the human mind:
Die Sprache aber liegt in der Seele, und kann
sogar bei widerstrebenden Organen und fehlendem
aeusseren Sinn hervorgebracht werden. Dies sieht
man bei dem Unterrichte der Taubstummen, der nur
daduch moeglich wird, dass der innere Drang der
Seele, die Gedanken in Worte zu kleiden,
demselben entgegenkommt , und vermittelst
erleichternder Anleitung den Mangel ersetzt, und
die Hindernisse besiegt. Aus der individuellen
Beschaffenheit dieses Dranges, verstaendliche
Laute hervorzubringen , aus der Individualitaet
des Lautgefuehls ... und endlich aus der
Individualitaet des Gehoers und der
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Sprachwerkzeuge entsteht das besondre Lautsystemjeder Sprache, und wird, sowohl durch seine
urspruengliche Gleichartigkeit mit dar ganzan
Sprachanlage des Individuums, als in sainen
tausendfachen einzeln gar nicht zu varfoiganden
Einfluessen auf alle Theile des Sprachbaues* die
Grundlage der besondren Eigenthuemlichkeit der
ganzen Sprache selbst. (IV, 117)^
Language has other properties as well. v. Humboldt picks
up Leibnitz's idea that language is a mirror of the mind,
from the structure of language we can infer the
structure of the mind:
Die Sprache ist aber durchaus kein blosses
Verstaendigungsmittel
, sondern der Abdruck des
und der Weltansicht der Redendan, die
Geselligkeit ist das unentbehrliche Huelfsmittel
zu ihrer Entfaltung, aber bei weitem nicht der
einzige Zweck, auf den sie hinarbeitet, der
vielmehr seinen Endpunkt doch in dem einzelnen
findet, insofern der einzelne von der Henschheit
getrennt werden kann. (v. Humboldt <1973, 22))
This is a most beautiful picture and shall stand at the
end of our journey through more than three centuries of
Cartesian philosophy and the study of language: Descartes
made it the basis of his language test, v. Humboldt
articulated this idea in the early nineteenth century and
Chomsky revived the position in the second half of the
twentieth century developing it to an explanatory
scientific theory: each individual member of the human
race shares with all others the ••Sprachvermoegen" and
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conversely the "Sprachvermoegen** essentially delimits
humanity
.
Eootnotes of Chgeter III
1. Chomsky did not really give a formal definition in his
book and we will not do so either in this thesis, since it
is hard to see who could benefit from such a definition.
We 3 ust want to stress the point that if either we or
Chomsky had to give a definition, it would of course be a
nominal definition not a real one, for as Arnauld (1662,
164f> writes:
Unlike nominal definitions, real definitions are
not arbitrary but must reflect the nature of the
referent of the defined word.
But “Cartesian Linguistics" doesn't refer in the real
world and therefore a real definition would be void of
empirical content. Note therefore, that if either we or
Chomsky were attacked on the grounds that the definition
of “Cartesian Linguistics" is historically inadequate etc.
this would be as irrelevant as the claim that the nominal
definition of “Cartesian product" as a set of ordered
n-tuples is wrong. Such a definition cannot be wrong, due
to its very status as a definition.
2. This point is often overlooked when Chomsky's works
are discussed in this respect. Although the views of
defenders of generative grammar are grossly misrepresented
quite frequently (we will give some examples below in the
main text; cf. also my "Ueber das Verhaeltnis von
traditioneller und generativer Grammatik"), this is
particularly true in matters concerning the current
debate. Aarsleff (1970) is a typical case. He writes about
Chomsky (1966):
I shall make an assumption, which I think will
be readily granted: namely, that Chomsky is in
fact attempting to give a historical account and
is not merely seeking out concepts, statements,
and arguments in an unhistorical fashion. (571)
This was written four years after Chomsky's book had been
published. On a page that Aarsleff quotes from wo find the
following introductory remarks by Chomsky whore he
announces that he will limit himself to
a preliminary and fragmentary sketch of some of
the leading ideas of Cartesian linguistics with
no explicit analysis of its relation to current
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work that seeks to clarify and develop these
ideas
.
And on the next page he goes on as follows:
The important problem is to determine the exact
nature of the "capital of ideas" accumulated in
the premodern period, to evaluate the
contemporary significance of this contribution,
and to find ways to exploit it for advancing the
study of language. (Chomsky 1966, 2f)
Aarsleff's paper thus misses the topic completely and we
will not give it any further attention.
3. The next quotation does in fact not appear in the final
version of the text, it was deleted before the work went
to print.
4. Hjelmslev (1974) develops a system which might be very
similar to Chomsky ^s if it were formalized.
5. Remember that Buehler (1934,77) had also made the same
point
.
6. Although different people might put more emphasis on
different aspects of v. Humboldt's work, according to
their special interest. Nothing is wrong with this as long
as one doesn't flatly and wrongly deny that the other
interpretation is valid, too.
7. This sentence was actually deleted in a later edition.
8 We find an interesting analogue to this conception of
sentence in the works of Herman Paul. In Paul (1919 Vol
III, 10) he writes:
Der Satz ist der sprachliche Ausdruck, das
Symbol dafuer, dass die Verbindung mehrerer
Vorstellungen Oder Vorstellungsmassen in der
Seele des Sprechenden sich vollzogen hat, und
das Mittel dazu, die naemliche Verbindung der
naemlichen Vorstellungen in der Seele des
Hoerenden zu erzeugen
.
The same definition we find in Paul (1880, 121).
9. A particularly dramatic example of language acquisition
by a deaf, mute and blind child is reported in Lorenz
(1977) who argues that there are also many facts from
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ethology that he and Irenaeua Eibl-Eibesfeld described
which argue for the conception that man is innately
endowed with certain behaviors and faculties. Cf. among
others Eibl-Eibesfeld (1970, 1976). From a biological
point of view, cf . Riedl (1984, 229).
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